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Toward a Partial Economic, GameTheoretic Analysis of Hearsay
Richard D. Friedman*
[W]hen they come to model Heaven,
And calculate the stars, how they will wield
The mighty frame, how build, unbuild, contrive
To save appearances; how gird the Sphere
With Centric and Eccentric scribbl'd o'er,
Cycle and Epicycle, Orb in Orb.1

I.

INTRODUCTION AND LIMITATIONS

Hypothetical 1: Propco is at trial against Oppco. Through an authenticating witness, Propco offers into evidence a memorandum evidently written by one of its employees, who is not identified on the
face of the memo. The memo recounts a conversation that the author
of the memo says that she had with an officer of Oppco. Propco offers
the memo to prove that the conversation occurred as recounted in the
memo. The memo has substantialprobative value for that purpose,
and there is no reason to exclude it-except for the rule againsthearsay. Oppco objects to the memo as hearsay.

Thus, a typical hearsay issue is presented to the court. The
memo is a statement made other than by a witness testifying at
the trial, and the proponent, Propco, is offering the memo to
prove the truth of a matter asserted in it. Thus, the opponent,
Oppco, is correct that, as offered for this purpose, the memo is
hearsay. Under the traditional doctrine, which still prevails in
American jurisdictions, the statement will be excluded unless
the court finds that the statement fits within an exemption
from the rule against hearsay.2 For example, Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d) lists between two and eight exclusions (de* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful
for the many helpful leads, comments, suggestions, and criticisms I have received during the preparation of this Article, especially from Ron Allen, Robert Axelrod, Guido Calabresi, Mian Dams ka, Joanna Friedman, Stephen
Gardbaum, David Goodhand, Jerry Israel, Avery Katz, Lash LaRue, Roger
Park, Michael Seigel and Eleanor Swift. Thanks also to John Lloyd for preparation of the diagrams and to Vivian James for her extraordinary efforts.
1.

JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Book VIII, lines 79-84 (Merritt Y.

Hughes ed., 1962).
2. I use the term exemption here in an all-inclusive manner, to cover
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pending on how they are counted) from the definition of hearsay, and Rules 803 and 804 state twenty-seven categorical
exceptions, plus two virtually identical broad-based residual exceptions. 3 The categorical exceptions are based principally on
the perceived trustworthiness of statements fitting within
them. The exceptions fill a role similar to that performed by
the "Cycle and Epicycle, Orb in Orb" of the Ptolemaic system
of astronomy scathingly described by Milton,4 and they create a
similar degree of complexity and contrivance.
In this Article, I offer a fundamentally different and nondoctrinaire way of approaching hearsay questions. In brief, I
take the view that the resolution of a hearsay dispute, when the
declarant is not on the stand, is essentially a matter of deciding
who should bear the burden of producing the declarant, or
more precisely, how courts should allocate that burden. Adopting a simple procedural improvement, concerning the examination of the declarant if she is produced as a witness, allows the
court to allocate the burden optimally. If live testimony by the
declarant would be more probative than prejudicial, then most
often-contrary to standard doctrine-the hearsay also is more
probative than prejudicial. When this is so, the court ordinarily
ought to impose the burden of producing the declarant on the
opponent, the party objecting to the hearsay. Sometimes,
though, other considerations-such as whether the proponent
has a substantial advantage in satisfying all or part of the burden of producing the declarant, or whether the proponent has
given late notice of his intention to offer the hearsay-may
warrant imposing part or all of the burden on the proponent.
For two reasons, I will not engage here in an extended discussion of reasons that hearsay doctrine should be fundamen5
tally reformed. First, others have made the case before.
Obviously, commentators have not reached anything resembling a consensus that the law should be overhauled; 6 if they
had, the change likely would have been accomplished by now.
both exclusions from the definition of hearsay and exceptions from the rule
presumptively excluding hearsay from evidence.
3. See FED. R. EvID. 801, 803, 804.
4. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5. E.g., Eleanor Swift, A FoundationFact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1339, 1343-54 (1987); Jack B. Weinstein, ProbativeForce of Hearsay,46
IOWA L. REV. 331, 340 (1961); Note, The Theoretical Foundationof the Hearsay
Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1793 (1980).
6. See, e.g., RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBuRG, A MODERN
APPROACH To EVIDENCE 520-25 (2d ed. 1982).
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An argument that such a change should be made will not, however, surprise anybody familiar with evidentiary debate. Second, I believe the theoretical foundation of so important a
doctrine is always a valid subject of inquiry, even without any
prior thought that any change of doctrine might result. Such
an inquiry might, in fact, reveal the extent, if any, to which a
theoretically ideal doctrine differs from the doctrine actually in
place. If the practical considerations in implementing the ideal
doctrine are not too daunting, then the theoretical inquiry may
itself be part of an argument for reform. This Article therefore
tries to develop from the ground up part of the framework for
an ideal law of hearsay, without any preconceptions or constraints imposed by current doctrine.7
As the previous sentence suggests, this Article works only
toward a partial theory of hearsay. The Article is not concerned, except where otherwise noted, with the context in
which a criminal prosecutor offers hearsay evidence against the
accused. That, of course, is the context in which the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution comes
into play." The confrontation right raises considerations not
present with other hearsay. Under current doctrine, there is a
close link between the ordinary law of hearsay and the law of
the Confrontation Clause. 9 I am convinced that, unless this
7. Lest there be any doubt-the system proposed here is meant to supplant, not supplement, the present hearsay system.
8. The Confrontation Clause provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. Under the test articulated in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), hearsay offered by the prosecution is not admissible unless the declarant is unavailable and the evidence demonstrates sufficient "indicia of reliability"; the
second branch of this test may be satisfied "without more" if "the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." I&. at 66. I do not believe the
test is a workable one, and the Supreme Court has treated it rather shabbily.
See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986) (refusing to consider whether a
confession should be considered to fit within the "firmly rooted" exception for
declarations against interest, and so to satisfy the reliability test without further inquiry); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (holding that, in
Roberts, the Court did not intend to establish the unavailability requirement
for hearsay other than prior testimony). Nevertheless, at least until recently,
the Court continued to insist that it adhered to the Roberts test. See Idaho v.
Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146-47 (1990). After White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736
(1992), however, it may be that the Court will not impose the unavailability
requirement as a matter of Confrontation Clause law on any statement that
fits within one of the categorical exceptions of Rule 803(1)-(23) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The ordinary exclusion of hearsay evidence under Rule
802 does not apply to statements fitting within those exceptions, irrespective of
whether the declarant is available to testify at trial. The brief discussion of
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link is broken, neither subject can be developed in a satisfactory manner. The need to protect criminal defendants' confrontation rights will tend to make hearsay law more restrictive
than it ought to be, and the need for a practical law of hearsay
will make the confrontation guarantee less protective than it
ought to be. I believe the link can be broken by articulating the
confrontation guarantee in terms that have nothing to do with
hearsay doctrine, and under which some hearsay offered by the
prosecution would not even present a confrontation issue.1 0
That, however, is not the subject on which I want to concentrate. Thus, to avoid a great deal of complexity, this Article
will not deal, except briefly, with prosecution evidence. When I
do consider such evidence, I will assume that, for reasons extraneous to the theory presented in this Article, the Confrontation
Clause presents no problem.
I will limit the discussion in other ways as well. For one
thing, although I have said that I want to develop a theory unconstrained by current doctrine, the analysis here will focus on
evidence that fits within the core of the standard definition of
hearsay. That is, I will assume that the evidence is proof of a
statement made out of court, and that it is offered to prove the
truth of a matter asserted in the statement.' 1 By thus assuming
away the question of whether the challenged evidence is hearsay, we can concentrate instead on the issue of when hearsay
should be admitted. Most of the analysis presented here, I believe, could apply equally well to evidence in the fuzzy area just
outside the standard definition-for example, to evidence of a
the Confrontation Clause presented here is substantially similar to, but updated from, that in Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedurefor Resolving Hearsay Issues, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 883, 885-86 nn.8-9 (1991).
10. In rough terms, I believe that the Confrontation Clause should be construed to exclude evidence of an out-of-court statement offered by the prosecution, regardless of the declarant's availability, if the declarant made the
statement with the anticipation that it might be used in the investigation or
prosecution of a crime and the accused has not had an adequate opportunity to
examine the declarant. Cf Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the
HearsayRule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 593-95 (1988) (suggesting a test similar in nature
but applicable only to available declarants). I would apply this test absolutely,
though the accused might forfeit his confrontation right if he wrongfully rendered the maker of the statement unavailable-such as by intimidating, kidnapping, or killing her. Under this approach, if a hearsay statement did not fit
within the confrontation protection, the accused still might assert a constitutional right to have the statement excluded unless the prosecution produced
the declarant (at least if the declarant was available), but such assertions
should be decided under general and flexible standards of due process.
11. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c) (providing the basic definition of hearsay).
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person's conduct offered to prove the truth of a belief apparently reflected in the conduct-or even to evidence further removed from the usual reach of hearsay law. If that is true, it
may mean that a sound approach to hearsay law would not depend on anything resembling the current definition of hearsay.
It might even mean that the concept of hearsay would disappear into a doctrine of broader scope. 2 For now, however, I am
not concerned with demonstrating that point, or testing the full
reach of the analysis presented here. The heartland of hearsay
is a large enough area for this Article to explore
without having
13
to worry about the borderland or the outland.
II.

THE BASIC HEARSAY MODEL

The discussion will focus on cases fitting the following pattern: One party, the proponent,makes known his desire to introduce evidence of a hearsay statement made by an out-ofcourt declarant. For now, we will assume that the proponent
gives notice of this intention well before trial. If the declarant
were to testify at trial to the substance of her out-of-court statement, the testimony would have sufficient probative value to
warrant admissibility, and no other factor would result in exclusion of the evidence. Evidence from this particular declarant-that is, either her out-of-court declaration or her in-court
testimony-is irreplaceable, in the sense that even if the proponent produced all the other relevant evidence that he could, the
declarant's evidence would have substantial probative value. 14
The proponent's adversary, the opponent, raises a hearsay objection to the evidence. He points out that the evidence is defi12. Under such a broader doctrine, the court generally would not rule an
offered item of evidence inadmissible, on the basis of the possible availability
of other evidence of the proposition that might be better from the court's point
of view, as long as: the procedures for presenting the better evidence are substantially the same whether the proponent or the opponent produces it; the offered evidence is more probative than prejudicial; and the opponent is not
substantially less able than the proponent to produce the better evidence. The
first of these conditions is simply a matter of the court's rules and generally
should be maintained. If the second condition also holds but the third does
not, then all or part of the burden of producing the better evidence usually
ought to be imposed on the proponent. If the second condition does not hold,
so that the offered evidence is more prejudicial than probative, it generally
should be excluded-but not necessarily if the opponent is substantially better
able than the proponent to produce the better evidence.
13. Cf Charles T. McCormick, The Borderlandof Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J.
489 (1930).
14. I address briefly the situation in which there might be a full replacement for evidence from the declarant. See infra note 60.
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cient, as compared to live testimony, in several respects. Most
importantly, the declarant did not make the prior statement
under oath, the opponent cannot cross-examine her, the jury
cannot observe her demeanor, and there may be doubt about
whether the declarant even made the statement.
Figure 1 presents the situation, as it is ordinarily understood, once the hearsay issue is presented to the court. Under
the standard doctrine, the court has two basic choices, which I
will label EXCLUDE and ADMIT, in response to the hearsay objection. The court's ruling determines the presumptive evidentiary result-that is, the result that will prevail if the losing
party decides to DO NOTHING in response to the ruling. If the
court decides to EXCLUDE the hearsay and the proponent decides to DO NOTHING, that result is NE-no evidence from the
declarant is received, either in the form of hearsay or by live
testimony. If, on the other hand, the court decides to ADMIT
the hearsay and the opponent decides to DO NOTHING, the evidentiary result is H-meaning that the court admits the hearsay
and the declarant does not offer any live testimony.
The presumptive evidentiary result is not necessarily the
final one, however. Whichever party loses on the hearsay motion may, instead of choosing to DO NOTHING, decide to PRODUCE the declarant. As is frequently recognized, if the judge
decides to EXCLUDE the hearsay, the proponent may PRODUCE the declarant as a witness at trial, assuming that this is
feasible, so that he will get the benefit of the declarant's evidence. Indeed, this inducement to produce "better evidence" is
one possible justification for some applications of the ban on
hearsay.1 5 If the proponent does select PRODUCE, the evidentiary result will be live testimony by the declarant, indicated by
the notation LT.
A corresponding possibility also is apparent, though it
seems to be less consistently borne in mind. If the judge decides to ADMIT the hearsay, the opponent also may decide to
PRODUCE the declarant as a trial witness (again assuming this
is feasible). His motivation would be to eliminate the defects in
the hearsay evidence about which he complained. When the
opponent does produce the declarant, the prevailing procedure
for examining her is, as explained in Part III, different from
that used when the proponent produces her. Hence, the nota15. See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle,73 IowA L. REv.
227, 282-83 (1988).
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Figure I

0

NE

tion LT* indicates the evidentiary result of production by the
opponent.
Figure 1 indicates not only the possible evidentiary results
but also the costs of each. I assume that if the proponent is not
produced, there is no substantial out-of-pocket cost, whether
the court admits the hearsay or not.16 Thus, 0 is marked under
both H and NE. If the proponent produces the declarant, the
cost is $pp, while if the opponent produces her it is $oo- The
first subscript in this notation indicates who bears the cost,
while the second indicates which party physically produces the
declarant. The two parties do not necessarily have the same
production costs. The double subscripts are necessary because,
as we shall see in Part V, it may be possible for one party to
bear the costs of the other producing the declarant. For now,
though, we will assume that each party bears its own costs of
production.
III. PROCEDURAL IMPROVEMENTS FOR
EXAMINATION OF THE DECLARANT
In an earlier Article, I proposed simple changes in the

manner in which the declarant should be examined when produced as a witness at trialyBecause these changes are crucial
16. Although this assumption will simplify matters, it is not crucial to
most of the analysis that follows; if the time or money required to produce the
hearsay is significant, these costs can be considered, along with the prejudicial
potential of the hearsay, as part of the total negative consequences of admitting the hearsay.
17. See Friedman, supra note 9, at 892-904.
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to the reformulation of hearsay law that I propose in this Article, I will summarize them and the considerations underlying
them.
For several reasons, LT, the procedure followed for examination of the declarant if the court excludes the hearsay and
then the proponent produces her as a witness, generally is superior to LT*, the procedure traditionally followed if the court
admits the hearsay and the opponent produces the declarant. I
therefore propose that LT ordinarily be implemented even
when the opponent produces the declarant.'8
First, consider LT. The court has excluded evidence of a
hearsay statement by an absent declarant, and the proponent
has responded by producing the declarant as a witness. Now
the proponent calls her to the witness stand as part of his case
and ordinarily asks her for her current testimony concerning
the underlying event or condition that was the subject of the
hearsay statement. Sometimes, even though the court excluded
the hearsay given the absence of the declarant, it might admit
the hearsay given that the declarant is testifying. In any event,
once the proponent is finished examining the declarant, the opponent may cross-examine her. The opponent's counsel has effective means of limiting her risks in cross-examining the
declarant.' 9 Simply rising to cross-examine a witness already
on the stand will not necessarily raise significant jury expectations as to what she expects the cross to yield. If she makes
any headway at all, she often can give the impression that she
is not particularly disturbed by the direct testimony and is satisfied by the cross.
Now consider LT*. The court has admitted evidence of the
hearsay statement as part of the proponent's case, and the opponent has responded by bringing the declarant to court as a
witness. The opponent cannot, however, subject the declarant
to questioning until after the proponent finishes producing his
evidence; in the meantime, the hearsay statement may sink
into the minds of the jurors. The opponent finally has a chance
to question the declarant when it is time for him to present evidence (either as part of his case-in-chief or on rebuttal), but
that means that he must interrupt the presentation of his own
18. Similarly, LT should be followed if the court splits the burden of producing the declarant between the parties (as I suggest the court should sometimes do) and the declarant is produced. See infra pp. 770-80.
19. See, e.g., Paul B. Bergman, A PracticalApproach to Cross-Examinationd Safety First,25 UCLA L. REV. 547, 555-75 (1978).
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version of events, shifting the focus back to the proponent's.
Indeed, calling the declarant to the stand is likely to result in a
repetition of the prior statement, thus increasing its impact on
the jury. Perhaps most troublesome to the opponent, the jury
will recognize that the opponent has brought the declarant to
the stand. This is likely to give the jury the impression that
counsel finds the testimony sufficiently damaging to be worth
the trouble of calling the declarant as a witness. Calling the declarant will also tend to create higher jury expectations for
what counsel hopes to accomplish; if the examination does not
yield any significant concessions, the jury is likely to regard it
as a failure, and therefore may place increased reliance on the
hearsay declaration.
These problems, making LT* more risky and less effective
than LT, are significant, and they account in large part for a
striking disparity. When the proponent presents the live testimony of a witness, the opponent's counsel most often will rise
and ask at least a few questions on cross-examination. On the
other hand, when a court allows the proponent to introduce the
hearsay statement of an absent declarant, even a declarant who
is readily available, the opponent very rarely responds by producing the declarant. This comparison suggests that the courts'
use of LT*, rather than LT, when the opponent produces the declarant of an admitted hearsay statement is usually detrimental
to the truth-determining process. The opponent is less likely to
less likely to do so effectively,
examine the declarant, and
20
under LT* than under LT.
Therefore, I have proposed that, even when the opponent
produces the declarant, the LT procedure ordinarily should be
followed. Thus, if the court decides to ADMIT the hearsay, that
ruling ordinarily should determine only what the evidentiary
result will be if the opponent does not produce the declarant.
But if the opponent undertakes to PRODUCE the declarant by a
prescribed time, and does so, the court should require the proponent to put the declarant on the stand or forgo use of the
hearsay. Assuming that the proponent does put the declarant
on the stand, he would examine her on direct, and the opponent then would cross-examine--all in ordinary course, just as
if the proponent had produced the declarant. Indeed, ordinarily the jury would not even have to know that the opponent
had brought the declarant to court.
20. For a fuller analysis of the reasons why LT* is inferior to LT, see
Friedman, supra note 9, at 892-904.
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Thus, regardless of the manner in which the declarant is
brought to court, the proponent ordinarily ought to examine
her first, as part of his case. Furthermore, I have proposed
that, if a court follows this procedure and the declarant testifies, the proponent's questioning should follow a sequence that
is sometimes, but not always, used under current practice. The
proponent first should ask the declarant for her current testimony concerning the underlying event or condition that is the
subject of the hearsay statement. Only after that should the
court make the final decision whether to admit the hearsay
statement. This sequence best allows the court to assess the
probative value and prejudicial impact of the hearsay statement.2 1 It also provides some assurance that the proponent is
not offering the hearsay in lieu of the declarant-witness's live
testimony because he anticipates that the live testimony would
22
not favor his case as much as the hearsay statement would.
As an illustration of how the procedure I have suggested
would work, consider the following hypothetical.
Hypothetical 2: Same facts as Hypothetical 1, except for the following:
Propco has made known its intention to offer the memo the week
before the trial. The court believes that the memo is substantially
more probative than prejudicial23 and is inclined to admit it Oppco
insists, however, that it is willing and able to produce the author of
the memo, if necessary, but that it does not want to be forced to put
her on the stand itself.

In this case, the court might follow a modified form of the
ADMIT procedure, as indicated by the left branch in Figure 2.
Under this procedure, the court holds the hearsay presumptively admissible but gives Oppco until a prescribed time in the
trial, during the presentation of Propco's evidence, to produce
the declarant. Until then, the hearsay will not be admitted. If
Oppco fails to produce the declarant by the prescribed time, as
indicated by DO NOTHING, the court will admit the hearsay. If
Oppco does PRODUCE her by the prescribed time, but Propco
decides not to put her on the stand (DO NOTHING), the hearsay
will be excluded.2 If Propco does PRESENT her on the stand,
21. See infra p. 761.
22. For a fuller statement of the reasons for implementing this order of
examination, see Friedman, supra note 9, at 900-04; see also infra pp. 760-61.
23. As suggested below, this comparison of the probative value and prejudicial potential of the evidence may be a principal determinant of the decision
of whether or not to admit the hearsay. See infra note 30 and accompanying
text.
24. The diagram indicates a cost of $00 if the opponent produces the declarant but the proponent decides not to put her on the stand. This cost might
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Figure 2

LT will be followed. That is, Propco will examine the declarant
on direct, first asking for her current recollection concerning
the underlying event or condition, and then, if it wishes, offering the hearsay statement into evidence. The court will decide
whether, given the current testimony by the declarant, it still
believes it ought to admit the memo. In any event, once Propco
is finished examining the declarant, Oppco will have a chance
to cross-examine.2
When standard hearsay law excludes evidence, it does so
largely on the ground that the opponent has not had a chance
to cross-examine the declarant. The problem is relieved only
partially by the opportunity that the opponent sometimes has
to produce the declarant; even if he does produce her, he gets
the benefit only of an inferior form of examination. The procedure I propose offers a solution to the problem more constructive than exclusion of the evidence. When the court believes it
is appropriate to relieve the proponent of all or part of the burbe saved, however, at least in some cases, if, before the opponent produces the
declarant, the court asks the proponent to commit as to whether or not he
would put the declarant on the stand if the opponent produces her.
25. Obviously, the availability of this procedure depends on the proponent
giving enough notice of his intention to offer the hearsay that production of
the declarant by the opponent is feasible. In Section D of Part V, in f pp.
783-91. I will address the implications of late notice. Until then, I will continue to assume that the proponent has not prejudiced the opponent's ability
to produce the declarant by the lateness of notice: If production of the declarant is difficult, expensive, or impossible, it would have been no less so than if
the proponent had given more notice.
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den of producing the declarant, it may do so and yet enable the
opponent, if he is willing and able to carry that burden, to
cross-examine the declarant as if the proponent produced her.
As the following discussion will demonstrate, the availability of
this procedure should therefore alter the way courts respond to
hearsay disputes.
First, however, note that, in some cases, it may not be
worthwhile to insist on the LT procedure rather than on LT*.
For example, suppose the out-of-court declarant is the opponent himself, and it is obvious to the court both that the opponent will testify in his own behalf and that the hearsay
statement ought to be admitted regardless of how the opponent
testifies. The court might yet decide, notwithstanding these
facts, to follow the LT procedure, perhaps on the ground that
the opponent ought not be required to wait until the end of the
proponent's case to have a chance to deny the statement or explain it away. On the other hand, often it will make sense to
allow the proponent to present the evidence as he wishes,
rather than to force him to put his adversary on the stand in
the middle of his own case. Of course, the opponent can testify
concerning the subject matter of the statement as part of his
own case. Presumably, the opponent's counsel will not be hindered in examining the opponent by having to put him on the
stand herself.
At least two conditions, both of them present in this example, seem to be essential for the LT* procedure to be preferable
to LT. The first condition is that the hearsay statement would
be admissible irrespective of the declarant's expected testimony. The second is that use of the LT* procedure would not
seriously hinder or inhibit the opponent's counsel in examining
the declarant. This Article principally concerns the procedures
that the court should use to decide hearsay questions and the
results they should reach, not the procedure for introduction of
evidence that the court already has determined admissible.
Hence, the Article will assume that the conditions that might
make LT* preferable do not prevail, and that if the court
chooses ADMIT, it will implement the modified procedure
presented in Figure 2. In short, no matter which party produces the declarant, the proponent should examine her first.
IV.

THE CRITERIA FOR DECISION

A. INTRODUCTION: THE NOTION OF EXPECTED VALUE
Assuming the hearsay issue is presented to the court, the
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court makes its ruling and then, if production of the declarant
is feasible, moves by the parties will determine whether or not
the declarant actually testifies. The court may conceive of its
task as selecting the ruling that has the greatest possible expected value. The expected value of any possible ruling depends on two factors: first, the payoff of each possible outcome
that might follow from that ruling, and second, the probability
that the parties' moves would yield that outcome, given the ruling. The expected value is the sum of the payoffs, discounted
by the probabilities.
Consider Figure 3. This diagram presents in somewhat sim-

Figure 3
court
ADMIT EXCLUDE
PRODUCE

LT

LT

DONaMNG

PROOUCE

Proponent

Opponent
H

NE

O NNG

plified form the chief possibilities indicated by Figure 2. As in
Figure 2, the court has only two choices, ADMIT and EXCLUDE,
represented here by the two columns. Once the court makes its
choice, the loser must pick a row, PRODUCE or DO NOTHING.
This diagram assumes that, if the opponent loses the initial ruling and chooses PRODUCE, the proponent will present the declarant's live testimony rather than forgo use of the hearsay.
Thus, there are four possible outcomes, each represented by a
cell of this matrix. Note that LT rather than LT* is entered in
the ADMIT-PRODUCE cell. This reflects the proposal, discussed
in Part III, that the court ordinarily implement LT rather than
LT*, no matter how the declarant might be produced. The expected value of ADMIT is the payoff of the ADMIT-PRODUCE
cell, discounted by the probability that the opponent would produce the declarant if the judge selected ADMIT, plus the payoff
of the ADMIT-DO NOTHING cell, discounted by the probability
that the opponent would not produce the declarant given a decision to ADMIT. The expected value of EXCLUDE would be
similarly determined by summing the discounted payoffs of the
two cells in the right-hand column. Thus, the choice of a ruling
seems to be the choice of the column with the greater expected
value.
That might seem a simple enough approach, but even in
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theory it would often work badly. Section B of this Part introduces the criteria for evaluating the payoffs of any given
outcome. It will reveal a difficulty facing the court: Accurately
gauging the payoffs depends in large part on information to
which the parties have superior access. Section C will show
that the courts often have a similar difficulty in assessing the
probability of each outcome. Frequently, then, the court will
have difficulty making any satisfactory determination of the expected value of each ruling.
Fortunately, these problems need not prevent the court
from making a sensible ruling on the hearsay issue. In Part V,
I will show how the court can allocate the burden of producing
the declarant in a way that, given the information available to
the court, optimizes the expected result.

B. COMPONENTS OF THE PAYOFFS
Under the somewhat simplified model presented here, the
outcome of the court's ruling will include one of three evidentiary results, H, NE, or LT. 26 The outcome also includes a cost
result. Figure 3 pictures three possibilities: 0 if the evidentiary
result is H or NE, -$00 if the opponent produces the declarant,

and -$pp if the proponent produces her. There are other possibilities as well, discussed in Part V, if the court splits the burden of production.
From the court's point of view, the payoff of the outcome
may have four separate components, which I will refer to as the
impact of the evidentiary result on the truth-determining process,27 cost, distributive justice, and fairness. I will consider the
first two components under the heading of efficiency. An evidentiary result is more efficient than another if, discounting its
impact on truth-determination by the cost of producing it, it ap26. This is a simplification because other evidentiary states are possible.
For example, an observer other than the declarant might testify to the same
proposition asserted by the hearsay declaration; depending an the court's ruling, it might cause the other observer to testify either in addition to or in lieu
of introduction of the hearsay, even though otherwise she would not. Also,
the hearsay might be admitted along with evidence concerning foundation
facts to assist the jury in determining the reliability of the statement. See infra note 60.
27. I am adopting the phrase "truth-determining process" from Confrontation Clause doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986);
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion). In the context of
the Confrontation Clause, I think the phrase is misleading, suggesting too instrumental a view of the right to confrontation. In other hearsay contexts,
though, it seems useful.
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pears superior to the other result. This definition, adopted for
expository convenience, does not eliminate the problem of incommensurability of truth-determination and cost.
1. Efficiency
Efficiency, as just defined, is clearly a critical part of evaluating the outcome of the court's ruling. No absolute scale for
measuring efficiency is necessary for the analysis presented
here. It suffices to assess the relative merits of the three possible results.
a. ComparingH to NE
Recall the assumption that if the declarant is not produced,
there is no substantial cost, whether the court admits the hearsay or not. Accordingly, the comparison of H to NE on efficiency grounds is simply a matter of determining which result
will have a better impact on the truth-determining process.
The court should be able to make this comparison reasonably
enough because it essentially knows what each of these results
will be when the hearsay issue is posed.
Standard hearsay doctrine points to three significant defects of hearsay evidence. Ordinarily, the hearsay statement is
not given under oath nor subject to cross-examination, and it
does not offer the fact-finder an opportunity to observe the declarant's demeanor. Another defect, less frequently accepted as
part of the reason for the hostility to hearsay, is simply that
hearsay requires a longer chain of inference. Instead of knowing firsthand what the declarant's report is, as it would if the
declarant testified, the fact-finder must rely on some other evidence of a purported declaration. 28
These are in fact significant deficiencies of H as compared
to LT.29 But this comparison is not the one now being examined; rather, the comparison is between H and NE. Usually,
a court analyzing the problem correctly should conclude that
the hearsay is more probative than prejudicial. That is, H is
usually preferable to NE from the standpoint of truth determi28. Roger C. Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86
MIcH. L. REv. 51, 56-58 (1987), calls particular attention to this factor.
29. But see Olin Guy Wellborn 1H, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075,"
1078-88 (1991) (casting doubt on the value of demeanor in assessing credibility). At the same time, the hearsay has at least one potentially significant advantage over live testimony: It was made closer to the events it describes and
so reflects a fresher memory. But the live testimony can, if necessary, be supplemented by the hearsay. See infra pp. 760-61.
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nation, notwithstanding the deficiencies of the evidence. 30
It is true that-at least in a jury trial, and at least theoretically-the hearsay may have substantial prejudicial impact.
The oath, demeanor evidence, and cross-examination are all
aids that the jury lacks in determining the accuracy of the declaration, and without their assistance, the jury may put too
much credence in the declaration, according it greater probative
value than it ought to have. The evidence must in fact have
substantial probative value, however. If it did not, the court
would reject the evidence without reaching the hearsay question. To conclude that the prejudicial impact outweighs the
probative value means not only that the jury would overvalue
the evidence, but also that the degree of the overvaluation
would exceed the actual probative value (however that is to be
determined). In other words, in this situation, when the choice
is between admitting the hearsay (evidentiary state H) and forgoing any evidence from the declarant (evidentiary state NE),
excluding the hearsay to assist the truth-determining process is
appropriate only if the jury is likely in some sense to accord the
evidence more than twice the probative value that it "ought" to
have.
That is overvaluation to a high degree. Depending on how
we define probative value, that degree of overvaluation may
even be impossible in some situations. If the prior probability
of the proposition that the evidence was offered to prove was
high enough, and if the "actual" probative value of the evidence
is great enough, thus increasing that probability further, there
30. Although I will now fill several pages defending this general proposition, which is hardly an original point, see, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 5, at 33536, I should emphasize its limited role in this Article. Under the system I will

propose in Part V (as well as other proposed hearsay systems, and perhaps
also the current system), whether or not the particularhearsay appears more
probative than prejudicial is an important datum in determining the court's
optimal ruling on that hearsay. I believe that the manner in which courts
make the probative-prejudicial determination in particular cases should be informed by the considerations discussed here. In particular, the court should
approach the question with an expectation-perhaps a mild presumptionthat, assuming live testimony would be more probative than prejudicial, the
hearsay statement would be as well. Apart from such inferential concerns,
however, the particular ruling does not depend on what is true in the run of
cases. The question of whether, or the extent to which, the general proposition concerning the probative-prejudicial balance is true affects only the overall nature of the results yielded by the system proposed here, not the result in
a particular case. Nor does it affect the validity of the system itself. If hearsay
is net prejudicial more often than I suppose, then the result of my system
should be to exclude the hearsay more often than I suppose-but that in no
way undercuts the system's value as the proper framework for decision.
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may not be enough room below the ceiling of certainty for the
jury to perceive the evidence as having double the probative
value. 31 More importantly, there is no empirical support for
the proposition that juries overvalue hearsay substantially,
much less that they overvalue it to such a great degree. Indeed,
to the extent that empirical research has examined the question, it appears that, in fact, juries substantially discount the
32
value of hearsay evidence, as we would like them to do. It is

even conceivable that at times juries over-discount. For exam31. How to measure probative value formally is a matter of some debate.
David Kaye and I exchanged views on this in a previous evidence symposium.
See Richard D. Friedman, A Close Look at Probative Value, 66 B.U. L. REv.
733 (1986); Richard D. Friedman, Postscript. On QuantdiyingProbative Value,
66 B.U. L. REV. 767 (1986); David H. Kaye, Comment Quantifying Probative
Value, 66 B.U. L. REV. 761 (1986). I have defined probative value, in accordance with Federal Rule of Evidence 403, as the arithmetic difference between
the posterior and prior probabilities of the material proposition. This definition may be overly simplistic; certainly it has been strongly criticized. Nevertheless, I will use the definition here to demonstrate the proposition stated in
the text, even though it is peripheral to my main argument; I hope that readers who find this definition of probative value unacceptable will simply ignore
this demonstration, and, if necessary, the proposition stated in the text, rather
than let this technical argument distract them from my main points.
Let p equal the prior probability of the material proposition, and L equal
the likelihood ratio of the evidence (the probability that the evidence would
arise if the proposition were true divided by the probability that the evidence
would arise if the proposition were not true). The posterior probability of the
proposition-that is, the probability of the proposition given the evidence-as
indicated by Bayes' Theorem is
pL/(pL + 1 - P),
and the probative value of the evidence is
pL/(pL + 1 - p) - p.
If the fact-finder accords the evidence twice its "true" probative value,
that means that the posterior probability of the evidence, according to the factfinder, is
p + 2[pL/(pL + 1 - p) - p].
This expression cannot be greater than 1, representing certainty. By simple
algebraic manipulations, this means that
[2pL - p(pL + 1 - p)]/(pL + I - p) < 1,
and that
pL + p(L - )( - p) < pL + 1 - P,
which reduces to
p(L - 1) <1.
In other words, if
p(L - 1) > 1,

then, using this scheme of measurement, the prejudicial overvaluation of the
evidence cannot be greater than the "true" probative value of the evidence.
32. See Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness
and HearsayEvidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 714-16 (1992); Peter Miene et al.,
JurorDecision Making and the Evaluation of HearsayEvidence, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 683, 691-98 (1992); Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching
the HearsayRule: EmergingFindings,GeneralIssues, and FutureDirections,
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pie, in cases in which it would not have been physically impossible to produce the declarant, the jury may accord excessive
significance to the proponent's failure to do so.
This argument suggests that the risk that the jury will
minimi e hearsay dangers is rarely so threatening in itself to
the fact-finding process that the hearsay evidence should be
considered more prejudicial than probative. This in turn suggests that, if live testimony of a given proposition would be
more probative than prejudicial, then the hearsay usually
would be as well. This conclusion, however, is subject to at
least three caveats.
First, the court may believe in a given case that the probative value of the evidence barely outweighs its prejudicial potential, even before it considers the hearsay dangers. The court
may be concerned, for example, that the proposition the hearsay is offered to prove, even if true, is of only meager value to
the case but may well inflame the jury. If so, the hearsay dangers might provide a marginal- reason to tip the balance the
other way. Even here, however, a court should take care. Inferring that the jury is likely to attribute clearly excessive
value to the hearsay requires not only a prediction about jury
behavior but also, in effect, a good deal of confidence that the
court itself is not attributing insufficient value to the evidence.33 Only rarely should a court be so confident that its
judgment will be so far superior to the jury's that exposing potentially probative evidence to the jury should be deemed a net
detriment to the truth-determining process.3
76 MINN L. REV. 655, 658-64 (1992). But see Richard 0. Lempert, Presentation
at Hearsay Reform Conference (Sept. 7, 1991).
33. Of course, courts substitute their judgment of the evidence for the
jury's when they grant a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. on the ground
that the evidence is insufficient to support a contrary verdict. In those cases,
however, the court rules in effect that a reasonable jury acting properly could
not make a given finding, accordingly, such a finding would demonstrate-if
the court gave the jury a chance to make it-that the jury did not perform its

task properly, and so would be insupportable. The court's ruling alters only
the result, not the base of information on which the jury makes its finding.
When the court excludes probative evidence as potentially prejudicial, by contrast, it limits the jury's information base because of fear that the jury may use
the information improperly to reach a verdict that it could find properly on
the basis of other evidence. (If the jury could not find the verdict properly,
then a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. would be appropriate.) The court
thus keeps the jury from considering evidence that the jury might have used
properly; presumably the evidence had sufficient probative value to warrant
admission, for otherwise it should have been excluded on that ground without
reaching the question of prejudice.

34.

Note that throughout this discussion, I am using "jury" as a proxy for
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Second, the very fact that the proponent has chosen to offer the hearsay, especially if he might have offered live testimony instead, may be significant. Often the cost or difficulty of
producing the declarant is sufficient explanation; the hearsay
may well be a second-best choice for the proponent. In some
cases, however, even putting cost and difficulty aside, the proponent may prefer the hearsay to live testimony. It may be
that the proponent has reason to believe that the declarant
would have a poor demeanor, would crumble under aggressive
adverse questioning, or would depart from the hearsay statement. Such possibilities do not necessarily imply that the proponent regards the hearsay as more prejudicial (in his favor)
than probative, but they might.3s Often, after the court questions the proponent's counsel, if not before, the opponent will
be in as good a position as the proponent to assess these possibilities, 3 6 and, if so, he may be able to inform the jury of
"fact-finder" and "court" as a proxy for "decision maker." The same essential
points would hold given other divisions of these two functions. The fact-finder
might be a judge rather than the jury. However weak may be the argument
that hearsay tends to be overvalued when the fact-finder is a jury, the argument is weaker yet when the case is tried by a judge, who is presumably at
least as aware of the dangers of the hearsay as a jury would be. The effective
decision making on admissibility might be made by an appellate court, a codemaking body, or the legislature, rather than by the trial court. Such a body
might have better information of a general nature bearing on the probative
value and prejudicial potential of hearsay, or categories of hearsay, than does
either the trial court or the jury, but it obviously lacks as full information concerning the particular case.
35. Here is a schematic way of thinking of the problem: The probative
value of the evidence is the benefit that the proponent would gain from the
live testimony, and the prejudicial impact is the incremental benefit, if any,
above the probative value that the proponent would gain from the hearsay.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (defining probative value in mathematical terms). Thus, if the proponent believes that the live testimony would
help his cause more than half as much as the hearsay would, then he believes
that the hearsay would be net probative to the truth-determining process. (A
forHti, the proponent believes that the hearsay is net probative if he believes
that, while the hearsay is helpful to his case, the live testimony would be more
helpful.) If, however, the proponent believes that the live testimony would offer him less than half the benefit that the hearsay would, or would actually be
counterproductive to him, then he believes that the hearsay would be net
harmful to truth determination.
36. The opponent will be in a worse position to do so only if the proponent has, or had, superior access to the declarant. In a civil case, however, if
the proponent can communicate with the declarant, then presumably the opponent could eliminate at least a large part of the differential by taking the
deposition of the declarant. Whether or not the opponent takes the deposition,
the court can question the proponent's counsel closely when the hearsay issue
is litigated in order to determine whether she has any reason, other than the
cost and difficulty of producing the declarant, for preferring the hearsay.
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them.3 7 Sometimes, though, the opponent will be unaware of
these possibilities, or unable to inform the jury of them adequately. Thus, in some cases, there is a residual possibility that
the proponent has offered the hearsay because of its prejudicial
potential and the opponent is unable to recognize the problem,
or at least to counter it with particularity. Even when this difficulty arises, however, it need not be crucial. It is likely to
arise only when the proponent has superior access to the declarant and the evidence is sufficiently significant that the proponent would be expected to produce the declarant, if her
testimony would favor him. These are the circumstances in
which a "missing witness" argument, perhaps supplemented by
an instruction from the court, is appropriate and likely to be
persuasive. Such an argument invites the jury to infer that the
live testimony would have been unfavorable to the proponent.
In short, while the jury may be unable to evaluate adequately
the possibility that the proponent's decision to offer the hearsay
was motivated by perceived problems in the live testimony, the
jury may well infer prophylactically that the motivation was
manipulative. This would eliminate at least much of the prejudicial benefit that the hearsay might otherwise have offered the
proponent.
The third caveat is that the court must consider the impact
of hearsay dangers on the probative value side of the scale, as
well as on the prejudicial impact side. Because of those dangers, the hearsay has less probative value than the live testimony would. Not only is it harder even for a hypothetically
ideal fact-finder to evaluate the credibility of an absent declarant, but the probative value of the hearsay must be discounted
by the possibility that the declarant did not even make the
statement attributed to her. Perhaps, for example, a witness
has concocted a statement of a supposed declarant to help the
proponent's case. Occasionally, at least in a case where admissibility of the live testimony would be marginal (because, for example, the proposition asserted is of slight materiality), a court
reasonably may conclude that this differential in probative
value is enough to tip the probative-versus-prejudicial balance
against the hearsay. Note that this differential does not depend
on any perception of jury defect. It is an appropriate factor to
37. The fullest means of informing the jury would be to produce the declarant as a witness. Here, though, I am assessing the situation in which the
hearsay is admitted but the declarant does not testify.
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weigh into the balance, though only rarely should it make a decisive difference.
b.

ComparingLT to H and to NE

Ordinarily, it is easy enough for the court to conclude that,
considering only the impact on the truth-determining process,
LT is superior to both H and NE. As compared to H, live testimony is superior for all the usually cited reasons--cross-examination, demeanor, oath-and because it avoids any doubt about
whether the declarant made the statement attributed to him.
The prior statement may appear to have one significant advantage over the declarant's current testimony: It may represent a
substantially fresher memory of the events. But that is no reason to prefer admission of the hearsay, with the declarant absent, to her live testimony. If the declarant testifies live, the
court can always admit her previous statement if it appears that
the statement would add anything of value to the current testimony.as Given this, LT can only be better than H for truthdetermination.
As compared to NE, we may assume that LT is superior for
truth-determination. If it were not-that is, if even the live testimony were more prejudicial than probative-then presumably
the court would exclude the hearsay evidence without even
considering its hearsay dangers.
The problem, though, is determining how much better LT
is than either H or NE. We have assumed that the presentation
of the hearsay will not in itself require any significant expenditure of resources. 39 Thus, the efficiency comparison between H
and NE does not depend on any cost considerations. Producing
the declarant may be costly, however, and the court should be
concerned about how much cost the parties incur as a result of
its ruling. Hence, the efficiency comparisons between a decision yielding LT and one yielding H, and between decisions
yielding LT and NE, depend on whether the difference in impact on the truth-determining process is worth the cost. Moreover, the cost might differ depending on which party produces
the declarant.
Each party is probably in a better position than the court to
38. See infra pp. 760-61 (discussing situations in which the declarant already is testifying). As discussed in Part m, if the declarant testifies, she
ought to be asked to testify concerning her current recollection before the admissibility of her hearsay statement is determined. See supra p. 732.
39. See supra p. 729.
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assess how expensive it would be for that party to produce the
declarant. Even if the court has good information on costs,4°
that does not solve the problem of determining whether LT is
sufficiently better than H or NE for truth determination to warrant the cost of producing the declarant. In our adversarial system, courts usually do not decide themselves whether an item
of evidence is worth the cost of production. Instead, courts generally leave the decision to the party who would benefit from
its production; that party likely is in a better position than the
court to determine the probable nature of the evidence and the
extent of the benefit. Indeed, the party ordinarily is encouraged to make an efficient decision because the court imposes the costs of producing the evidence on him.
2.

Distributive Justice

Arguably, distributive justice4 1 is an appropriate factor in
evaluating an outcome. In some cases, there is a significant disparity in the parties' ability to pay for producing the declarant,
as suggested either by their overall wealth or the extent to
which they have been willing to devote resources to the litigation. In such a case, the court might take this disparity into account, on the ground that, if the declarant is to be produced,
justice calls for the production to be paid for by the party better
able to do so. At least arguably, though, it is inappropriate for
the court to attempt to alter distribution of wealth in this
way.42 Having offered the suggestion, therefore, I will neither
40. In Part V, I assume that the court does have some information on
costs, albeit not necessarily as much as the parties themselves.
41. Cy. George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 537, 547 n.40 (1972) (noting that distributive justice is defined in terms

of wealth and status rather than conduct).
42. Hearsay litigation is, at best, a clumsy method for redistribution of
wealth. See id. ("What is at stake is keeping the institution of taxation distinct
from the institution of tort litigation."). On the other hand, if one party has
greater wealth than the other, or has devoted more resources to the litigation,
this suggests he is more willing to pay to avoid an undesired evidentiary result;
arguably, then, payment by him of the cost of producing the declarant leads to
a more satisfying distribution. It would be difficult for a court to determine
more precisely which party is more willing to pay to avoid a disfavored evidentiary result. Perhaps in some cases it could try this technique: In separate
conversations (because it is saying different things, or at least varying its emphasis), the court tells the proponent that it is prepared to exclude the hearsay
and tells the opponent that it is prepared to admit the hearsay. The court tells
each party that the only way it can guarantee to avoid this result is to bid a
sum that is both greater than his adversary's bid and sufficient to produce the
declarant. The court then relays bids back and forth, and the highest bidder
loses. Thus, if the proponent is the highest bidder, the hearsay is excluded,
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defend it nor rely on it; I will put it aside. I will consider separately whether it is appropriate for the court to take into account for another reason the parties' relative ability to paynot out of a sense of distributive justice, but on the ground that
the most efficient result is most likely to be reached if the burden of producing the statement is imposed on the party best
able to bear it.
3. Fairness
Another consideration of justice, which may be referred to
by the shorthand of fairness, is at least presumptively more
clearly an appropriate factor to take into account. 43 The question essentially is this: Given all the facts, does any consideration of fairness suggest which party should bear the burden of
producing the declarant and suffer an unfavorable evidentiary
result if the declarant does not testify?44
Most American lawyers, I suspect, would respond instinctively that the proponent ordinarily should be the disfavored
party. After all, it is the proponent who wants to offer evidence from the declarant, and in a form, as hearsay, that the
court regards as deficient compared to live testimony.45 Thus,
it appears that it is the proponent's job to remove the hearsay
problem.
except that if his bid is sufficient to produce the declarant, she will.testify.
This technique depends on deception. For that reason, even putting aside the
question of appropriateness, it could not succeed frequently.
43. Cf Fletcher, supra note 41, at 547 n.40 (noting a premise of corrective
justice "that liability should turn on what the [party] has done, rather than on
who he is").
44. This question is vague in defining what fairness means in this context,
for two reasons. First, I mean the term to be a sort of reservoir after other
considerations, particularly the evidentiary result and cost, are taken into account. I am thus using the term in a manner similar to the use by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed of the locution "other justice reasons."
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1105 (1972); cf. Fletcher, supra note 41, at 550 (defining a fairness principle in the torts context that "all individuals in society
have the right to roughly the same degree of security from risk"). Second, for
the reasons explained in the text, I believe that, in the context addressed by
this Article (recalling that this does not include the confrontation context),
there is no independent consideration of fairness that adds anything in deciding the hearsay question that is not already taken into account by considering
the impact of the evidence on the truth-determining process and the cost of
producing the declarant. But see infra note 46 (discussing possibility of a confrontation-like right in civil cases with respect to statements made in anticipation of litigation).
45. See supra pp. 743-44. ("Comparing LT to H and to NE").
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I disagree with this point of view-which, I suspect, accounts in large part for the tenacity of the rule presumptively
excluding hearsay. Just out of prudence, I should emphasize
once more that I am not discussing the context in which confrontation rights may come into play. Outside that context, I
believe, fairness generally, and perhaps always, points in the
same direction that efficiency does. The basic reason for this
congruence is that fairness depends on the same two factorsimpact on truth determination and cost-as efficiency does.
It is easy enough to see why these two factors relate to fairness. Suppose first that the court is persuaded that H and NE
are equally unsatisfactory for truth determination, that whichever party loses the hearsay motion will surely produce the declarant, and that one party could produce the declarant easily
whereas the other could do so only with great difficulty. Here,
it seems fair as well as efficient to impose the burden of producing the declarant on the party who can do so at least cost.
Now consider the following hypothetical:
Hypothetical 3: Paul is suing Otto for the wrongful death of his wife,
Violet as the result of an auto accident He wants to introduce the
testimony of Wanda Witness that the week cdfter the acciden Donna
Declarant who had been a passenger in Violet's car, said, 'That man
ran a red light and hit us broadside." Donna later died of injuries
received in the crash. Otto opposes introduction of the hearsay.

Because the declarant cannot be produced, the outcome
will be on the lower row of the basic matrix, Figure 3. In this
case, the court need not consider any cost considerations. The
declarant will not testify, and, by hypothesis, the hearsay is
cost-free to produce.
Otto's counsel, well schooled in traditional hearsay law,
may argue as follows: "If the hearsay is admitted, the jurors
will consider it even though they will not have had a chance to
observe the declarant make the statement, which was not
under oath, and even though I will not have had a chance to
cross-examine the declarant. That would be unfair." But
Paul's counsel might respond as follows: "That is no fault of
mine, for I cannot produce the declarant. If the hearsay is not
admitted, the jury will be deprived of probative evidence for
which there is no adequate substitute. That would be unfair."
I believe that resolution of the fairness question must
clearly depend, at least in part, on whether the hearsay is more
probative than prejudicial. Suppose that it is; in other words, H
is superior to NE for truth determination. If we like, we might
characterize the result of admitting the hearsay, with no hope
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for Otto to examine the declarant, as unfair to Otto. But at the
same time we would have to characterize the result of excluding the hearsay, with no hope for Paul to present other evidence from Donna, as unfair to Paul. Given the hypothesis that
H is superior to NE for truth determination, the second type of
unfairness outweighs the first.
I will draw a stronger conclusion, though it may be a matter of assertion and definition as much as, or more than, one of
inference. I believe that, apart from cost considerations, the
fairness question (outside the Confrontation Clause context)
depends solely on truth determination. In other words, putting
cost aside, the fairer of two rulings on a hearsay question is the
one that best supports the determination of truth.
Perhaps this oversimplifies the nature of civil trials. Perhaps, at least in some civil contexts, there is a fairness interest
in protecting, even in derogation of truth determination, the
type of symbolic or psychological interests that I believe the
Confrontation Clause should be thought to protect.4 6 Perhaps
such an interest is pervasive, and perhaps in some civil contexts
it is strong. But I believe that it is not pervasively strong, and,
therefore, I will put it aside, along with the confrontation
context.
To say that fairness and efficiency depend on the same factors does not necessarily mean that they always point in the
same direction. One may be affected relatively more than the
other by a particular factor. Thus, Part V will examine fairness
consequences, but it will do so only briefly. If a ruling yields an
incremental truth-determination benefit, but at a cost to one
party that somehow seems excessive, or if it saves on cost, but
at an excessive loss in truth-determination ability, the ruling
seems unfair as well as inefficient.
46. In my view, the Confrontation Clause generally ought to bar the prosecution from offering a statement made by a declarant who anticipated use of
the statement in the investigation or prosecution of a crime, unless the accused
has had an adequate opportunity to examine the declarant. See supra note 10.
Such a rule would often operate in derogation of the truth, but it would offer
the accused a sense of fair treatment because he could not be subjected to
criminal punishment without a chance to confront his accusers. Arguably, a
similar rule should be applied in some civil contexts when the consequences
are very grave and especially when the state is a party-when, for example,
civil commitment or termination of parental rights is at issue.
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We have seen that, with respect to some of the information
that the court would need in evaluating the payoffs of the possible outcomes, the parties have access superior to that of the
court. The same is often true if the court attempts to determine the probability of each outcome given its ruling.
Sometimes the court can assess reasonably accurately the
difficulty and expense each party would face in producing the
declarant. 47 When production by a given party is impossible or
unfeasible, the court can predict easily enough that if it places
the physical burden of producing the declarant on that party,
the declarant will not be produced.
The court will not always be favored with such certainty,
however. The probability that a party, on whom the court has
imposed all or part of the burden of producing the declarant,
actually will satisfy the burden does not depend solely on how
difficult that burden is. It also depends on how much (if at all)
the party would prefer live testimony to the state that would
prevail if he did nothing-that is, to NE if the losing party is the
proponent, and to H if the losing party is the opponent. That
often will be a difficult judgment for the court to make. Consider the following hypothetical.
Hypothetical 4: Paul Proponent and Otto Opponent are litigating
over the terms of the will of Theresa Testatrix. Paul wants to prove
that Theresa was very upset with Otto after a particularrun-in, and
he makes known his intention to offer the testimony of Wendy Witness that Deborah Declarantsaid to Wendy, the day after the even4
"Theresa was really angry with Otto yesterday." Otto moves to exclude the testimony as hearsay. Deborah is within reach of the subpoena power, but in a distant city. Either party could produce her,
but it would be erpensive.

The court might well wonder why Otto made the objection.
Did he really regard admission of the hearsay as a worse result
than live testimony by Deborah? True, if Deborah testifies live,
Otto's cross-examination might render her testimony less credible. But it is also possible, perhaps more likely, that Deborah
will be able to testify vividly and memorably to just how angry
Theresa was, and that cross-examination will not be effective at
all. Indeed, it may be that, cost factors aside, Paul would have
vastly preferred to offer Deborah's live testimony rather than a
second-hand report of her summary out-of-court statement47. See infra pp. 751-52 (discussfing assumptions concerning a court's
knowledge of difficulty and expense).
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and that Otto is relieved that cost did induce Paul to offer the
hearsay. It may well be that Otto interposed the objection, not
in hopes that it would induce Paul to produce Deborah as a live
witness, but in hopes that it would force Paul to do without any
evidence at all from Deborah.4 8 In short, given the choice between admission of the hearsay and live testimony by Deborah,
Otto might affirmatively fear the latter. If that is so, and perhaps even if it is not, Otto will not produce Deborah if the
hearsay objection is unsuccessful. It will be difficult, however,
for the court to read Otto's mind in advance with sufficient
clarity to understand the motivation behind the objection and
his likely response to an adverse ruling.
Of course, the court might try to find out how each party
would respond to an adverse decision simply by asking him.
Often, though, that would be useless or counterproductive.
Even if the court could discover a party's intention without distorting that intention by the process of asking, the information
would not necessarily be helpful. Suppose, for example, that
the judge knows that Otto would not respond to ADMIT by producing Deborah. The court still might not know whether Otto
would fail to produce Deborah because the burden of doing so
is too great in relation to the benefits he would receive, or
whether in fact he prefers admission of the hearsay to
49
Deborah's live testimony.
Moreover, if either party knew that his statement of intent
might affect the court's ruling, that prospect might distort his
behavior. In an attempt to win the hearsay ruling, he might
disclaim an intention to produce the declarant in the event of
an adverse decision, even though that would be his best response to such a decision. This consideration leads to a complicated game-playing situation, which the court is probably best
off avoidings °
48. If Otto were litigating in an inappropriately nasty manner, he might

have had the subsidiary hope that, if the objection did result in the production
of Deborah as a live witness, at least that might impose costs on Paul.
49. To use a symbolic form, if Otto declines to produce the declarant, it is
because he finds (LT - $oo) < H-that is, the live testimony, discounted by the
cost of production, is less preferable than mere admission of the hearsay. Or,
equivalently, (LT - H) < $o-the incremental benefit (if any) of the live testimony over the hearsay does not warrant the cost. But this does not tell the
court whether $o , the cost, is large; or whether (LT - H) is positive but smallthat is, Otto would prefer live testimony to hearsay, but not by much; or
whether (LT - H) is negative-that is, Otto would actually prefer mere admission of the hearsay to the declarant's live testimony.
50. The parties might consider giving the court incorrect information as to
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In short, the court should restrain the impulse to ask,
"What would you do if I held against you?" Instead it will get
better information if it concentrates on "just the facts." As I
will now argue, a better question, and one on which the court
could usually gain adequate information, would be, "How costly
and difficult would it be for you to produce the declarant?"
V. SELECTING A RULING
A.

INTRODUCTION: THE ASSUMED INFORMATION BASE AND A
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS

Part IV showed that the court would often have difficulty
both in evaluating the payoff of an outcome and in determining
how probable the outcome is given a particular ruling. In particular, the court probably will have difficulty determining
whether LT is sufficiently preferable for truth-determination
purposes to H and NE to warrant the cost of producing the declarant. And often it will have at least as much difficulty determining whether a party bearing all or part of the burden of
producing the declarant would find LT so much more advantageous to the alternative result-H for the opponent, NE for the
proponent-to warrant satisfying the burden. 51
These considerations suggest that, as a rule, the court's best
course may not be to guess and evaluate the probable outcomes
of each possible ruling. Of course, when the court knows that
the declarant cannot be produced, it knows what the outcome
of its ruling will be--either admission or exclusion of the heartheir intentions, but over the long run this probably would be counterproductive. If the parties committed themselves beforehand, either because they realized they could not be disingenuous or because the court held them to their
statements of intention, strategic considerations might dominate their decision
making. Interestingly, one possible response by the court would be to adopt a
"mixed strategy," introducing a certain amount of randomness into its ruling
so that the parties would not know precisely how a given combination of statements of intention would affect the ruling. See ERIc RAsMusEN, GAMES AND
INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY

69-73 (1989) (explaining

mixed strategies).
I do suggest that, in certain situations, the court call on parties to commit
themselves in advance as to whether or not they will perform given portions
of the burden of producing the declarant-but only after the court has ruled,
making clear what the consequences of a given decision or combination of decisions by the parties will be. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
Once the court has made that ruling, it has taken itself effectively out of the
game, and the parties do not have the opportunity or concern of affecting the
court's ruling by making their own choices.
51. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in
determining the parties' preferences).
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say-and it can evaluate those results. But when the court
lacks this certainty, its best approach is generally to try to allocate the burden of producing the declarant in such a way that,
consistent with fairness, the parties' own self-interest will lead
to an efficient result.
This Part will analyze how the court should make that determination. It suggests that the court should base its decision
primarily on two factors, and it assumes that the court does
have adequate information on these factors. I believe that the
court usually can gather this information quickly and efficiently by questioning counsel; decision making under the system I am suggesting need not entail excessive administrative
costs.
The first factor is the net probativeness of the hearsaythat is, the extent to which the hearsay is more or less probative than prejudicial. Put another way, the question is whether
H is preferable, from the truth-determining perspective, to NE.
I will assume that the court can evaluate this factor simply by
comparing the state of the proof with and without the hearsay.
In other words, the court can evaluate the two alternative presumptive evidentiary results of its ruling.
The second factor is the difficulty and expense each party
would have to endure to alter this presumptive evidentiary result by producing the declarant. The court needs some, but not
necessarily full, information with respect to this factor. It is to
each party's advantage to persuade the court that its costs of
producing the declarant are high, but in most cases an inquisitive court, aided if necessary by the adversary's argument,
would probably be able to detect substantial inflation in a
party's statement of its costs. At least the court usually should
be able to determine whether or not one party is substantially
better able than the other to produce the declarant. Often that
is all the court needs to know.
Thus, Section B assumes, with respect to this factor,
merely that neither party has a significant advantage over the
other in producing the declarant. It also assumes that the proponent has given adequate notice of his intention to offer the
hearsay. Under these circumstances, the court ought to choose
the presumptive evidentiary result, H or NE, that best advances
truth determination. When the declarant cannot be produced,
this ruling is optimal because the presumptive result is the final one as well, and it is fair as well as efficient that the result
be the one that is best for determination of the truth. When
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production of the declarant is feasible, such a ruling offers benefits beyond the presumptive result. The party losing the ruling makes the decision whether to alter that result to LT by
producing the declarant. It is efficient for this party to make
the decision, because it is he who is best able to determine
whether the benefits he would receive by producing herwhich coincide closely with the benefits to the truth-determining process--are worthwhile given the costs. And it is fair that
this party bear the costs of producing the declarant, if she is to
be produced, because it is he who is dissatisfied with, and
wishes to alter, the best result possible in the absence of the
declarant.
Note that under this analysis, the court, having satisfied itself that neither party is substantially better able than the
other to produce the declarant, need not worry how difficult
producing the declarant actually would be.5 2 In other words,
having concluded that there is no substantial difference between the parties with respect to the second factor, the court
can put that factor aside. No matter how difficult production
would be-impossible, burdensome, or easy-both fairness and
efficiency support admission of the hearsay if (as I have contended is usually the case) the hearsay is more probative than
prejudicial.
Section C examines how this conclusion is altered when
one party is in fact substantially better able than the other to
produce the declarant. Here again, full information with respect to the parties' respective abilities to produce the declarant
is not necessary, but it will be helpful for the court at least to
have confidence that one party can feasibly produce the declarant and that the other would find production substantially
more difficult or expensive. In some circumstances, it makes
sense to impose at least part of the burden on the party best
able to bear it, even though absent the disparity the considerations addressed in Section B would favor imposing the burden
totally on the other party. The best result may involve splitting
the burden between the parties, such as by imposing the finan52. Note the difference from standard hearsay doctrine. Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 804, in some circumstances unavailability of the declarant is
a decisive factor supporting admissibility of hearsay, even though there is no
difference in the parties' respective abilities to produce the declarant. Put another way, under the Federal Rules, availability of the declarant may be a decisive factor supporting exclusion of the hearsay, even though the opponent is
as able as the proponent to produce the declarant.
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cial burden on the opponent and part or all of the physical burden on the proponent.
Finally, Section D examines the implications of late notice.
Sometimes, but not always, a failure to give early notice warrants imposing all or part of the burden on the proponent.

B. SELECTING A RULING WHEN NOTICE IS ADEQUATE AND
NEITHER PARTY HAS A SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGE IN
PRODUCING THE DECLARANT

This Section assumes that, as is usually the case, it is not
substantially easier or less expensive for one party than for the
other to produce the declarant. Even if the declarant is a friend
of one party, for example, the other might easily secure his attendance by subpoena.
The first three subsections of this Section will examine
separately three different situations that lie along a continuum-when production of the declarant is, respectively, impossible, feasible but burdensome, and easy. This breakdown is
made for analytical purposes only. As suggested in Section A, a
court need not be concerned about the category into which the
particular case falls, because the appropriate result is the same
for all three: The court should admit the hearsay if it is more
probative than prejudicial.53 The basic reason for this result
may be stated briefly. Assuming that neither party is better
able than the other to produce the declarant and also that (as I
have proposed), if she is produced, the evidentiary result is the
same whichever party produces her, then the most sensible result is to pick the best presumptive evidentiary result. This imposes on the losing party the burden of altering that result if it
appears worth his while to do so.
Subsection 4 discusses the different situation presented
when the declarant is actually on the stand testifying. Finally,
Subsection 5 discusses the application of the approach suggested here to hearsay statements created for litigation.
1.

Production of the Declarant Impossible

In some cases, it may be impossible for either party to produce the declarant. The simplest case, of course, arises when
the declarant is dead. Recall Hypothetical 3, in which Paul
53. As I have already argued, this is usually the case when the only substantial hurdle to admission of the evidence is its hearsay character. See supra
pp. 737-43.
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sought to introduce the declaration of a person who observed
an accident and subsequently died. Because the declarant cannot be produced and the hearsay is, by hypothesis, cost-free to
produce, cost considerations do not enter into play. As a matter
of both fairness and efficiency, the question comes down simply
to whether H is preferable to NE for truth determination-that
is, whether the evidence is more probative than prejudicial. If,
as I have argued above,m most often hearsay as to which there
is no other ground for exclusion is more probative than prejudicial, then most often the court should admit a hearsay statement by a declarant who cannot be produced.
2. Production of the Declarant Feasible but Burdensome
Consider again Hypothetical 4, in which Paul offers the
hearsay statement of a declarant who lives far from the courthouse, and whom either party could produce at trial but only at
considerable expense. I vim analyze this situation first under
the assumption that, as I believe is usually the case, the hearsay
is more probative than prejudicial. At the end of this subsection, I will analyze briefly the case in which this assumption is
not true.Given the truth of this assumption, it is once again better,
as a matter of both efficiency and fairness, to admit the hearsay. For one thing, the presumptive evidentiary result of the
decision, H, is more satisfactory than is the alternative, NE: The
assumption means that H is superior for truth determination,
and, under the analysis presented in the last subsection, a fairer
result as well.
But, because production of the declarant is feasible, the
presumptive evidentiary result may not be the final one; the
party losing the court's decision might decide to produce the declarant. Accordingly, we must consider the efficiency and fairness consequences of imposing the burden on either party.
As to efficiency, the court often cannot be sure whether or
not producing the declarant would be an efficient result. The
court can be confident, however, that a decision to ADMIT,
which will impose on the opponent the burden of producing the
declarant, is likely to lead to the more efficient result. Given
the assumption that H is preferable to NE for determining the
truth, the key question is whether LT is enough better than H
54. See supra pp. 737-43.
55. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
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to warrant the costs of production. The opponent is clearly the
party better able to make that determination, because he is the
one who would benefit from the production. Indeed, given H as
the alternative, the opponent's interests are similar to the
court's. The court should regard as a negative factor any costs
the opponent incurs in producing the declarant, and as a positive factor any probative evidence helpful to the opponent that
producing the declarant yields.6
Thus, if the opponent perceives that the likelihood that live
testimony by the declarant would benefit his case is sufficient
to warrant the cost of production, he will produce the declarant. Correspondingly, if he does not think that live testimony
would be sufficiently better than the hearsay to make the costs
worthwhile, he will not produce her.5 7 As suggested in the previous discussion of Hypothetical 4,58 the opponent might have
made the hearsay objection even though from his point of view
live testimony might appear barely better, or even worse, than
simple admission of the hearsay. His true objective might have
been to dissuade the proponent from offering any evidence at
all from the declarant. Thus, imposing the burden on the opponent makes him put his money where his mouth is.
Now compare EXCLUDE as a possible ruling. The proponent may decide that the live testimony is not worth producing
and resign himself to NE. This is exactly the result the opponent wishes, but ordinarily it is one that the court should regard as unsatisfactory because, by assumption, it is worse than
H. The proponent may decide to produce the declarant, but fre56. The opponent's interests in deciding whether or not to produce the declarant do not exactly coincide with the court's. Producing the declarant
might yield probative evidence helpful to the proponent, such as vivid details
and a persuasive demeanor. The court would regard this positively, but the
opponent would not. Thus, in some cases, the opponent might not produce the
declarant even though the court would regard production as beneficial. The
court need not worry about this, however, because the fact that the proponent
has offered the hearsay shows that the benefits to him of producing the declarant are ones that he is willing to forgo, given the difficulty of producing the
declarant. Given that the proponent is satisfied with H and prefers it to NE,
the possibility that, putting aside the difficulty of production, he might prefer
LT to H cannot be the reason to decide the hearsay issue against him.
57. Sometimes the opponent may be hampered in making this judgment
by uncertainty regarding the reasons for the proponent's decision to offer the
hearsay rather than produce the declarant-that is, whether the proponent
merely wished to save cost and effort or whether he perceived that the live
testimony would be less helpful to him than the hearsay. This difficulty is not
usually enough to warrant a prophylactic rule excluding the hearsay. See in-

fra note 82.
58. See supra pp. 748-50.
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quently this will be wasteful. Often it will be true (though the
court will have difficulty in knowing just when) that LT is far
more satisfactory, costs of production aside, to the proponent
than NE, and that, from the court's point of view, LT is only
moderately more helpful to the truth-determining process than
H. In Hypothetical 4, for example, Paul might decide that he
simply cannot do without some evidence from Deborah showing that Theresa was very upset after the run-in with Otto. It
may be, though, that there is only a small chance that live testimony by Deborah, subject to cross-examination, will yield substantially more useful information than would Deborah's
hearsay statement. Paul will produce the declarant as long as
the costs are no greater than the large gap that he perceives between LT and NE, but the result will be inefficient, as compared
to H, if the costs are greater than the smaller gap that the court
would perceive between LT and H. This situation will arise
often. Frequently, as discussed earlier, an opponent in Otto's
position will make the hearsay objection even though, costs of
production aside, he perceives H as nearly as good an eviden59
tiary result as LT, or even better.
Thus, assuming that the hearsay is more probative than
prejudicial, it is efficient to impose on the opponent the burden
of producing the declarant. Considerations of fairness point in
the same direction. Ordinarily, when a party offers evidence
that the court deems more probative than prejudicial, the court
admits the evidence, leaving it up to the other side to produce
rebutting evidence. Even if the court is concerned that the primary evidence, if unrebutted, may mislead the jury, it often
does not exclude the evidence. Rather, the court may decide
that it is up to the opponent to produce any evidence he thinks
will put the primary evidence in the proper light, just as any
party ordinarily has a responsibility to present whatever evidence that he hopes will support his case. The court should follow the same principle in the hearsay context. The proponent,
after all, has offered the evidence-the hearsay-that he finds
satisfactory, and the court has, by hypothesis, found that this
evidence does more good than harm. If the opponent truly believes that another type of evidence-in particular, the live testimony of the declarant-will be more to his advantage, then it
60
is fair and proper for him to bear the burden of producing it.
59. See supra pp. 748-49 (discussing Hypothetical 4 and the possibility that
Otto may prefer H over LT).
60. The essence of this analysis can be generalized to whatever form of
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Note how much easier it is to accept imposition of that burevidence the opponent believes would be more acceptable proof than the hearsay statement of the proposition at issue. Suppose, for example, that the opponent believes that another observer could testify to the proposition asserted by
the hearsay statement and that the alternative observer could be more readily
produced as a witness than the declarant could. If the proponent nevertheless
decides to offer the declarant's hearsay statement, and the court concludes
both that the statement is more probative than prejudicial and that the proponent is not substantially better able than the opponent to produce either the
declarant or the other observer, the court probably ought to rule ADMIT. The
procedural proposals offered in Part III should also be extended, however; the
opponent should be given the opportunity to produce either the declarant or
the other observer before the court finally decides the admissibility of the
hearsay. It may be that, given the live testimony of the other observer, the
hearsay statement has insufficient probative value to warrant admissibility.
One other related caveat is appropriate: If the proponent could easily produce
the other observer but nevertheless decides to produce the hearsay, the court
may have reason to suspect that the proponent made his choice because of
weaknesses he perceives in the potential live testimony. This suspicion is essentially the same that may arise, whether or not there is another observer in
the picture, from the proponent's decision to favor the hearsay over the declarant's own testimony.

Tentatively, I believe the analysis in the text also generally applies to evidence concerning foundation facts about the circumstances surrounding a
statement that allow the trier of fact to assess the reliability of the statement.
See Swift, supra note 5, at 1355-61 (suggesting a reformulation of hearsay law
in which the proponent's introduction of evidence bearing on foundation facts
would often be critical). Sometimes, of course, the proponent may wish to introduce evidence bearing on foundation facts-showing, for instance, that the
declarant is an honest person who would have no interest in making the statement in question if it were not true. If the opponent challenges the declarant's
credibility, such evidence would presumably be permissible, to the extent that
it responds to the challenge. (If the opponent makes no such challenge, the
evidence might be considered needless bolstering.) But, as long as there is a
sufficient basis suggesting that the declarant (or each declarant in the chain, in
the case of multiple hearsay) made her statement on the basis of personal observation, I do not believe the proponent presumptively ought to be required,
as a precondition to admission of the hearsay, to introduce evidence bearing on
foundation facts. As stated in the text, the proponent has offered the evidence
that he is satisfied to offer, and the court has by hypothesis determined that it
does more good than harm. Therefore, it appears to me that if the opponent
desires that, assuming the hearsay is admitted, evidence be introduced that
bears on the foundation facts and that presumably tends to impeach the declarant, then ordinarily the burden of producing such evidence ought to be imposed on the opponent. In some cases, the opponent might be satisfied to
introduce hearsay evidence bearing on the foundation facts, in accordance with
standards governing ordinary hearsay.
The burden might have to be adjusted if the proponent is substantially
better able than the opponent to produce the foundation fact evidence that the
opponent desires. In such a case, the court might impose on the opponent the
financial burden of producing the foundation fact evidence and on the proponent the physical burden. (Note that Part V.C., infra at pp. 775-79, discusses a
similar division of the burden, and other possible divisions as well, with respect to the hearsay evidence itself.) Under such a ruling, if the opponent ex-
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den on the opponent given the procedural modification I have
proposed, in which LT rather than LT* is the usual evidentiary
result even if the opponent is the one producing the declarant.
This modification means that imposing the burden on the opponent has no adverse consequences for the quality of examination he may make if the declarant does testify.
If, contrary to the assumption made in the discussion
above, NE is preferable to H for truth-determination, then efficiency considerations favor choosing NE in the first instance,
leaving it to the proponent to decide whether production of the
declarant is worthwhile. And fairness considerations point in
the same direction as efficiency, albeit perhaps less strongly
than when the hearsay appears more probative than prejudicial. The proponent should bear the burden of producing the
declarant, and if she is not present, the hearsay ought not be
61
admitted.
3. Production of the Declarant Feasible Without a Substantial
Burden
Hypothetical 5: Propco offers against Oppco a memorandum written
five years earlier by one of its officers, Della Declarant The memo
records the terms of a fairly simple transaction that Della had just
completed over the phone with an officer of Oppco. The transaction
has a peripheralbearing on the litigation, and Propco is offering the
memo to prove that the terms of the deal were as recorded by Della.
Della's office is located one mile away from the courthouse; either
pressed willingness to pay for production of the foundation fact evidence, the
proponent would be obligated, subject to a sanction, to produce the evidence.
A powerful sanction for the proponent's failure to produce would be exclusion
of his hearsay. No more powerful sanction would ordinarily be needed, because exclusion generally gives the opponent all he could want in opposing admissibility of the hearsay. Exclusion might not be necessary, however. It may
be a sufficient sanction to instruct the jury that it should draw an adverse inference from the failure to produce; this might be particularly effective if the
opponent also introduces impeaching hearsay evidence bearing on the foundation facts.
61. This conclusion might be less strong because of the point made earlier
that admitting rebutting evidence, rather than excluding primary evidence, is
usually the preferred remedy when unrebutted primary evidence appears unduly prejudicial. At least when the superiority of NE to H for truth determination appears doubtful, the court might take the view, if it is confident that the
opponent could produce the declarant, that the proponent ought to be allowed
to introduce his preferred form of testimony, with the opponent retaining the
ability to correct its prejudicial impact. Nevertheless, it seems to me on balance that the opponent should not have to bear a significant burden to clear
up evidence that is so defective that the court regards it as more prejudicial
than probative.
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party could produce her as a witness without significant difficulty.
Oppco objects to admission of the memo.

The easier the burden is for both parties, the lower are the
stakes of the hearsay decision. If the court chooses EXCLUDE
and Propco is dissatisfied, it can produce Della. Similarly, if
the court chooses ADMIT and Oppco is dissatisfied, it can produce her. Assuming that, as I have proposed, the court implements LT whichever party produces the declarant, the court's
decision would not affect even the procedure for examining
Della if, in fact, she is produced.
Though the stakes are lower, the analysis of Subsection 2
prevails. If the evidence appears to be more probative than
prejudicial, it is both more efficient and fairer to select ADMIT,
letting the opponent decide whether or not the value of live
testimony is sufficient to warrant whatever burden production
of the declarant would require. If he does not produce her, the
court will admit the hearsay. If he does produce her, however,
the proponent must put the declarant on the stand or forgo use
of the hearsay.
The polar case of an easy-to-produce declarant is one who
is already in the courtroom.
Hypothetical 6: Same facts as Hypothetical 5, except that Della is actually in the courtroom. Propco had not been planning to call her as
a witness, however.

In this case, producing the declarant is essentially effortless. Therefore, assuming as before that the court would implement the LT procedure even after selecting ADMIT, the court's
ruling on the hearsay objection has no impact. If the court
selects EXCLUDE, Propco would then be put in the position of
having to decide whether to put Della on the stand or to do
without evidence from her altogether. If the court selects ADMIT, Propco would be put in the exact same position: Oppco
would be able to put Propco to that choice without cost to itself,
because it can produce Della without effort, and clearly Oppco
wants to put Propco to the choice, for if it did not it would not
have made the objection in the first place. In other words, the
key decisions in resolving this situation are first the opponent's,
in deciding whether or not to object, and then the proponent's,
in deciding whether to put the declarant on the stand or to do
without evidence from her. The court really has nothing to do
with the result; the stakes of the court's ruling are zero.
4. The Declarant Already Testifying
In characterizing the declarant already in the courtroom as
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the polar case of a declarant who is easy to produce, I have
treated separately the declarant who is already on the stand.
That case, as the following hypothetical will help show,
presents a different type of situation.
Hypothetical 7: Same facts as Hypothetical 5, except that Della is actually testifyingfor Propco. This might have occurred because
(a) Prpco decided on its own initiative to produce Della,
(b)Propco offered the memo, Oppco objected, the court sustained
the objection, and Propco decided to produce Della, or
(c)Propco offered the memo, Oppco objected, the court overruled
the objection, but Oppco timely produced Della, and (pursuantto

the LT procedure), Propco decided to put Della on the stand
rather than forgo use of any evidence from her.
Without asking Della about the event that was the subject of the
memo, Propco seeks to introduce the memo through her. Oppco

objects.

Given that Della is already on the stand and testifying,
there is no remaining burden in seeking her testimony. The
only burden that was, or might have been, imposed on Oppcoto produce her so that Propco could put her on the stand and
examine her-has been satisfied. Demanding that Propco procure Della's live testimony only requires that Propco ask the
62
questions.
The question here, therefore, is not how to allocate the
burden of producing the declarant, as it is when the proponent
wishes to introduce evidence of a hearsay statement by a declarant who is absent, yet could be produced. Rather, the first
issue is a procedural one. As noted in Part III, the better procedure is first to require the proponent to ask the witness for her
current testimony of the underlying event or condition. 63 This
procedure helps prevent the proponent from hiding behind the
hearsay statement when the live testimony may not be as
favorable to him. It also ensures that the ultimate ruling on admissibility of the hearsay can be made optimally, in light of the
declarant's testimony. Thus, the court's best response to
Oppco's hearsay objection in Hypothetical 7 would be to say
something like this to Propco's counsel: "Your adversary is
right. First let's find out what she can testify to from memory."
But while this procedural ruling delays, it does not avoid,
62. It is possible in some circumstances that, although Della is on the
stand, the full burden of producing her has not yet been satisfied because she
has a privilege that she intends to assert. I am using "on the stand" as a shorthand for "on the stand, ready, willing, and able to testify."
63. For a fuller statement of the considerations supporting this procedure,
see Friedman, supra note 9, at 900-04.
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the need to rule on the ultimate question-admissibility of the
hearsay statement. Once the court is satisfied that the proponent has drawn out of the declarant the testimony she is now
willing and able to give, it should then determine whether admitting the hearsay statement will, on balance, help or hinder
the truth-determining process.
If the declarant claims to have no memory of the underlying event or condition, then the situation is much as if she were
dead or otherwise totally unavailable, as in Subsection 1. In
most cases, the hearsay will presumably be more probative
than prejudicial, and so should be admitted.
At the other extreme, suppose the declarant professes to
have a perfect memory of the subject, and the hearsay statement is perfectly in accord with her testimony. The court
might decide, depending on the circumstances, that the statement is a virtually useless, time-wasting attempt to bolster her
testimony, and so should be excluded. 64
Of course, there are other possibilities as well. If the hearsay statement is consistent with, but more detailed than, the
current testimony, the court might decide that it has enough incremental probative value to warrant admissibility. The court
might reach the same result if the statement is inconsistent
with the current testimony. If the statement would have been
admissible had the declarant not testified, ordinarily it has no
less probative value simply because the declarant testifies inconsistently with it.65
64. This would not be true if the hearsay statement was made before the
time of an alleged failure in a testimonial capacity that, according to the opponent, accounts for the declarant's live testimony; for example, if the opponent
contends that the declarant's testimony is explained by the fact that one year
before trial the opponent fired her, this contention is undercut by proof of a
statement consistent with the testimony and made two years before trial. See
FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(B) (providing that a prior statement by a witness who
is subject to cross-examination at trial is not hearsay if the statement is "consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive").
65. The statement would, in any event, be admissible for impeachment;
the hearsay question is whether the statement should be admitted for the
truth of the matter it asserts. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), a
prior inconsistent statement is exempted from the hearsay rule only if it "was
given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition." Other jurisdictions, however, differ widely in
their treatment of this issue.
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Hearsay Statements Created for the Purpose of Litigation

The relatively hospitable attitude toward hearsay suggested
here might encourage parties, in advance of trial, to prepare
statements for adoption by cooperative declarants. The parties
might then offer the statements instead of live testimony by
the declarants, or in addition to the testimony when the testimony turns out not to be as favorable as the hearsay. To some
extent, this seems to raise the possibility of trial by affidavit.
For several reasons, though, I do not believe that this prospect
is usually troublesome.6
First, recall again that the approach suggested here is not
meant to be applied when a criminal defendant's confrontation
rights are at stake.6 7 In that context, the possibility of the prosecution protecting against a turncoat witness by preparing an
affidavit that could be used to convict the defendant, no matter
what the witness' testimony, should indeed be considered intolerable. But that is not the subject of this Article.
Second, outside the confrontation context, trial by affidavit
may be a good thing to some extent. True enough, affidavits
are often an inferior form of evidence, not only to live testimony but to other types of hearsay as well. Production of live
evidence is often expensive, however, even where it is feasible,
and the proponent does not always have the good fortune that
the potential witness happens to have made a hearsay statement in provable form. Most often it is the proponent, not the
opponent, who, cost considerations aside, would prefer the live
testimony of the declarant to her affidavit. Much can be said
for allowing the proponent to offer the type of evidence that he
finds most cost-effective, so long as that evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Moreover, in some respects an affidavit, taken alone, is actually superior, even from the court's
point of view, to the declarant's current testimony, taken alone.
Affidavits are efficient to present in court, they may reflect a
fresher memory than trial testimony, and they often reflect
greater care and precision than the oral testimony of a nervous
witness on the stand responding immediately to questions
66. I have addressed a related problem that might be thought to arise, see
Friedman, supra note 9, at 898 n.27-the prospect that the proponent would
attempt to shift costs to the opponent by declining to produce the declarant in
the anticipation that the opponent will bear the costs of doing so. See Ronald
J. Allen, The Evolution of the HearsayRule to a Rule of Admission, 76 MINN.
L. REV. 797, 808-09 (1992). For reasons explained in the prior article, I do not
believe that this prospect is very worrisome either.
67. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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posed orally. The ideal result, time and cost considerations
aside, would often be presentation of the live testimony and the
affidavit-but sometimes that result will not be efficient.
Third, to the extent that affidavits are inferior to live testimony, the opponent usually has effective remedies. At the very
least, the opponent can point out the non-adversarial setting in
which the affidavit was made. There seems to be no particular
reason why the jury would be unable to appreciate this factor.
When production of the declarant is feasible, the opponent can,
as with other forms of hearsay, produce her if he really thinks
the defects of the affidavit are sufficiently important to make
production worthwhile. As this Section has argued, it is both
efficient and fair that the opponent have the burden of producing the declarant, assuming that he is not substantially less able
than the proponent to do so and that the statement is more probative than prejudicial. And if the declarant is on the stand but
retreats behind the affidavit, perhaps claiming an inability to
remember the underlying facts, this testimony will often provide the opponent with excellent impeachment material.
Finally, there is a short answer to the argument that the
theory presented here would allow a corrosive form of evidence: If the court concludes in the particular case that the evidence is really more prejudicial than probative, the theory
should not allow the evidence. Circumstances of the given case
might, for example, arouse the court's concern that in fact the
proponent's counsel prepared the statement because she could
make it favorable to her side but feared the effects of live testimony in a setting not totally under her control. Sometimes,
then, the court's skepticism about a statement prepared for litigation might be sufficient to exclude the evidence. This possibility does not, however, warrant a broad rule of exclusion.
C.

SELECTING A RULING WHEN ONE PARTY HAS A
SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGE IN PRODUCING THE
DECLARANT

Section B assumed that it is not substantially easier for one
party than for the other to produce the declarant. But this is
not always the case. For any of various reasons, some of which
will be suggested in this discussion, one party might be better
able to perform one or more of the tasks necessary to produce
the declarant. Indeed, in some cases only one party could produce the declarant at all.
When the hearsay is more probative than prejudicial, as is
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usually the case, and the opponent has the production advantage, the solution is easy. Under the analysis of Section B,
when the parties have substantially equal ability to produce the
declarant, the better ruling is ADMIT, imposing on the opponent
the burden of producing the declarant. This ruling is a fortiori
the better one if the opponent has a substantial advantage over
the proponent in producing the declarant. Correspondingly,
when the hearsay is more prejudicial than probative, and the
proponent is better able to produce the declarant, EXCLUDE is
clearly the better ruling, more strongly than when the parties
are equally able to produce her.
The more difficult, and interesting, cases arise when the
factors cut in opposite directions. Subsection I will concentrate
on what I believe is the more common, and so more important,
of these situations-the situation in which the hearsay is more
probative than prejudicial, but the proponent has a substantial
advantage in producing the declarant. Subsection 2 will briefly
address the reverse situation.
1.

When the Hearsay Is More Probative Than Prejudicial,
and the Proponent Possesses a Substantial
Production Advantage

Section B has shown that, if the hearsay is more probative
than prejudicial and neither party has a substantial advantage
in producing the declarant, then both efficiency and fairness
call for requiring the opponent to decide whether producing the
declarant is worth the cost and to bear that cost if the proponent is in fact produced. The arguments underlying this conclusion retain some force even when the proponent is
substantially better able than the opponent to produce the declarant. H is still, by hypothesis, a better presumptive evidentiary result than NE, and it is still the opponent who wants to
alter that result. But if the proponent's advantage in producing
the declarant is sufficiently pronounced, and especially if only
the proponent can produce her at all, then powerful countervailing considerations of fairness and efficiency may favor imposing the physical burden on the proponent. If the opponent
would substantially prefer live testimony to hearsay, then it is
both unfair and inefficient for him to have to forgo the opportunity to examine the declarant because he cannot produce her
feasibly though the proponent could do so easily. And if the declarant is to be produced, putting the opponent to great trouble
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and expense seems clearly less fair and efficient than having
the lower-cost party do the work.
How should the court resolve these competing considerations? Ideally, the court would select a ruling that achieves two
aims. First, the ideal ruling minimizes costs because, if the declarant is to be produced, the proponent performs that portion
of the work that he can do most easily. Second, the ideal ruling
maintains the proper incentive structure (given that the evidence is net probative), because the opponent decides whether
it is worthwhile to produce the declarant and bears the (mini-

mized) cost of doing so.
Sometimes, but not always, the court might be able to
achieve, or approach, this ideal result. Any of various solutions
might be reasonable, depending on the circumstances of the
particular case. Much of the discussion below will focus on the
following hypotheticals and variations on them.
Hypothetical 8: Propco makes known three weeks before trial its intention to offer a hearsay statement by Dina Declaran one of its
sales representatives. Dina spends most of her time in other states,
but she virtually always spends at least one night every two weeks at
her apartmentin Courthouse City. Oppco does not know her schedule, but it could, with some difficulty, track her down and subpoena
her. Propco, on the other hand, could simply call her on her car
phone at any time and tell her to come immediately to trial. The
court is satisfied that the statement is more probative than
pre dicial.
Hypothetical 9: Propco wants to introduce a memo written five years
ago by a person not identified on the face of the memo. The authoris
presumably no longer with Propco, because three years ago Propco
closed the office from which the memo was written. By checking a
coded notation on the memo againsta list in its files, Propco could
easily determine the name of the declarantand her address as of the
time she left Propco'semploy. Oppco has no feasible means of identifying the declarant The court believes the memo is more probative
than prejudicial.
Hypothetical 10: In his litigation against Otto, Paul wants to introduce a statement made a year before by a casual acquaintanceof his,
Dorothy Declarant Paul has lost touch with Dorothy, but they have
mutual friends. Otto has no idea where Dorothy lives. The court believes that the statement is more probative than prejudicial.
Hypothetical 11: Paul wants to introduce the hearsaystatement of his
sister,Denise. She is in Eastern Europe, beyond the subpoena power.
The court believes that her statement is more probative than prejudicial. It also believes that if it is importantto Paul that Denise testify,
he could persuade her to do so, so long as her expenses arepaid. Otto,
however, could not compel her to testify.
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Hypothetical 12: Albert Acker is the accused in a felony case. The
prosecution wants to introduce evidence of the out-of-court statement
of Diana Declaran a former collaboratorof Acker's. The court is
able to satisfy itself that the statement is not excluded by Acker's
rights under the Confrontation Clause. The court also believes that
the statement is more probative than prejudicial. Diana lives in a
distant state, but either party would be able to secure her presence
pursuant to the "Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses
from Without a State in CriminalProceedings." The problem is that
Diana has made clear, through counse that if called to testify she
would claim her Fifth Amendment privilege against se~f-incrimination. There is, in fact, a theoretical possibility that Diana could be
prosecuted and that the prosecution would use her statement against
her. It is highly unlikely, however, that she will be prosecuted, because her involvement in the criminal enterprise was tangential at
best and, in any event the statement is at most mildly inculpatory of
her.

These hypotheticals reflect a variety of advantages that one
party might have over the other in producing the declarant--an
advantage in information, as in Hypotheticals 8 and 9, or in access to information, as in Hypothetical 10; an advantage in ability to persuade the declarant to appear without waiting for a
subpoena, as in Hypothetical 8, or even though she is beyond
the subpoena power, as in Hypothetical 11; and an advantage in
extinguishing a privilege, as in Hypothetical 12. Other advantages are also possible. 68 In particular, it may be that, although
the cost and effort of producing the declarant would be the
same for both parties, one party is substantially more able than
the other to bear those costs. I do not present any hypotheticals involving disparate ability to pay because I believe only
very tentatively that it is an appropriate factor for the court to
69
take into account.
68. One party may, for example, have superior access to necessary means
of transportation. See Friedman, supra note 9, at 919-20. The proponent may
also have a significant advantage if he does not give sufficient notice of his own
intention to offer the hearsay (which implies a possibility that, if the hearsay
is excluded, he will produce the declarant). The problem of late notice is addressed separately. See infra pp. 783-91.
69. I have already addressed the question of whether ability to pay ought
to be taken into account for distributional reasons. See supra part IV.B.3.
There is a separate question of whether it ought to be taken into account for
efficiency purposes. Suppose, for example, that the court is convinced of the
following:. H is somewhat better than NE for truth determination, but LT
would be substantially better than either; if the presumptive evidentiary result
were NE, the proponent would find it easily worthwhile to produce the declarant; but if the presumptive result were H, the opponent would find production
too expensive. The court thus might be tempted to choose EXCLUDE rather
than ADMIT, inducing the proponent to produce the declarant. The proponent
is likely to object that H is really nearly as good a result as LT, and perhaps
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The following pages examine in turn each of several possible rulings, suggesting circumstances in which each might be
appropriate.
a. Admitting the Hearsay
In Hypothetical 8, Propco has an advantage, perhaps substantial, in producing the declarant. Nevertheless, the court
might still select ADMIT, as it ought to do if neither party had
such an advantage. True, it would cost Oppco more to produce
Dina than it would cost Propco, but at least two factors still
favor imposing the burden on Oppco. First, given that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial, Oppco is the party
that should bear the costs of producing Dina. Second, it may be
that Oppco would choose not to produce her even if its costs of
doing so were as low as Propco's. If so, imposing the burden on
Propco because of its advantage in producing the declarant
would needlessly cause it either to produce her or to forgo evidence from her.
Beyond that, it is plausible that, even if the court selects
ADMIT, Propco would agree with Oppco to produce Dina. Perhaps this seems strange at first. Propco, after all, offered the
hearsay rather than Dina's live testimony, and the court's ruleven better from the opponent's point of view, so that even if there were no
disparity in ability to pay, the opponent would not be inclined to produce the
declarant. Thus, the proponent will argue, the court has chosen an inferior
presumptive result, NE, and forced him to remedy it at unnecessary expense.
A possible resolution is that the court ought to take the proponent's superior ability to pay into account only if it is confident that: first, the disparity is
substantial; second, H is not substantially superior to NE for truth determination; and third, LT is so substantially superior to H for truth determination
that, if the opponent had the proponent's ability to pay, the opponent would
produce the declarant if the evidentiary result otherwise would be H. In addition, the court might consider splitting the financial burden-for example, by
imposing on the opponent that portion of the cost that would entail the same
welfare loss to the opponent as if he had the proponent's ability to pay and
bore the entire cost of producing the declarant. This would be a form of the
SPLIT BURDEN solution. See infra pp. 770-75. (Note that some other possible
responses discussed in this section to a production advantage held by the proponent-selecting ADMIT and leaving it to the parties to negotiate a deal under
which the opponent would compensate the proponent for producing the declarant, or imposing the physical burden of production on the proponent and
the financial burden on the opponent-do not make sense when the proponent's advantage is in ability to pay.)
Thus far I have spoken of ability to pay, but it may be that, so far as efficiency is concerned, the precise question, or at least another question, is inclination to pay for a given benefit in litigation. That is, a party's litigation
budget might be a more useful datum than his net worth, because it gives a
better indication of whether he would find a given expense worthwhile.
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ing of ADMIT supports its right to do so. Nevertheless, Oppco
may be willing to make producing the declarant worth Propco's
while. Given that Propco could produce her more cheaply than
Oppco could, there is room for a deal between the parties, particularly if Propco is persuaded that, absent a deal, Oppco
would produce her anyway. For example, Oppco's counsel
might say to Propco's:
Well, congratulations on beating my motion to exclude. But I
can't let Dina's statement in without examining her. I'll stake out her
apartment in town if I have to, but you're not really going to litigate
like that, are you? Listen, if you promise to bring her in, I'll _
"

The blank might be filled in with various types of consideration-perhaps an amount of money at least as great as Propco's
cost of producing the declarant, perhaps some benefit in the litigation, such as reciprocal cooperation by the opponent. The effective result of such a deal would be that Propco bears the
physical burden of producing the declarant, and Oppco, in one
coin or another, bears the financial burden, plus perhaps a premium to induce Propco's cooperation.
For several reasons, transaction costs may be low enough
70
to make this sort of deal feasible. There are only two parties,
and they are already in contact with each other. Moreover,
their counsel have recurrent dealings, perhaps from one litigation to another, 71 but, more importantly, within the same litigation. Cases last for some time, usually presenting numerous
side issues subject to negotiation. Indeed, there may be many
items of hearsay, offered by both sides, as to which the parties
might resolve questions of admissibility and production of declarants by negotiation. Litigators learn that life is much easier
if they can deal with their adversaries. Professional etiquette
might also, even apart from any considerations of self-interest,
encourage lawyers to be accommodating.
One advantage of this type of voluntary transaction between the parties is that they will enter into it only if it makes
sense, and it will make sense only if the proponent's costs of
production appear likely to be substantially lower than the opponent's. Thus, if the hearsay appears more probative than
prejudicial, and transaction costs appear to be low, the court
may find it best to select ADMIT, without worrying very much,
70. That is a hypothesis of this model. See supra p. 727. Sometimes, of
course, there will be more parties, but they will always be known to each
other.
71. Though rarer than in earlier times, such recurrent contact may still be
important in relatively small cities and in specialized areas of practice.
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at least up to a point, as to whether the proponent is substantially better able than the opponent to produce the declarant.
If, in fact, it appears to the parties that the opponent can produce the declarant as or more cheaply than the proponent can,
the deal will not be made. And if the parties believe that the
proponent can produce the declarant much more cheaply, and
the opponent would like to produce her at that cost, then the
parties would likely agree between themselves to shift the
physical burden. When transaction costs are low, therefore, the
court can have confidence that the declarant will be produced,
if at all, in the most efficient way. The court may not need to
worry very much which party would produce her.
For three reasons, however, the court might sometimes
hesitate to adopt this solution. First, the proponent may be unwilling to deal at all, at least at a price that the opponent would
be willing to pay. This is especially possible if (as in Hypotheticals 9 through 12) it is not feasible for the opponent to produce
the declarant. Under that hypothesis, a deal would not simply
change the identity of the party producing the declarant.
Rather, it would cause a different evidentiary result-LT instead of H. In some cases, the proponent, satisfied with H but
fearful of what LT might bring, may be unwilling-at least for a
price substantially less valuable than victory in the litigationto achieve the latter result instead of the former. Thus, there
may be no deal, even if the opponent would be glad to cause the
declarant's production if all he had to pay was the proponent's
costs and perhaps even a modest premium. The court might be
inclined to select ADMIT only if it perceives that the opponentalbeit perhaps indirectly, and at a somewhat elevated cost, as
the result of a deal-is essentially as able as the proponent to
cause the production of the declarant. If a deal is not a practical possibility, this premise might not hold.
Second, if the parties make a deal, the proponent might extract from the opponent a large premium over the proponent's
production costs. The greater the proponent's production advantage is, and the more each party thinks the declarant's live
testimony would benefit the opponent of the hearsay, given
that the alternative is admission of the hearsay, the larger the
premium will tend to be. The court might not appreciate the
proponent's use of the ADMIT ruling as the occasion for exercising a sort of monopoly power, making a profit at the expense of
the opponent. 72
72.

In some cases, though, the proponent might argue with some reason
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Third, in some cases, transaction costs may be quite high.
The hostility between the parties may be so great that it is difficult to have efficient negotiations on the substance of the litigation, much less on side issues. Moreover, just the lawyers' time
necessary to negotiate whether the proponent will bring the declarant to court, and the consideration that the proponent will
receive for doing so, may not be worthwhile.
In some cases, therefore, even though the proponent is far
better able than the opponent to produce the declarant, the
court might decide that it should not depend on the prospect
that the parties will make a deal shifting the physical burden to
the proponent. In such a case, the court might conclude that
the simple ADMIT ruling is not appealing (even though the
hearsay is more probative than prejudicial) and therefore might
impose on the proponent at least part of the burden of producing the declarant. In my earlier article, I have suggested that
there are various ways the court might split that burden.73 The
best way to do this depends on the precise circumstances.
b. Dividing the Physical Burden
In some cases, it makes sense to give the proponent the
burden of performing part of the set of tasks necessary to produce the declarant. This type of ruling may be labeled SPLIT
BURDEN.
Hypothetical 9, involving a statement by an unknown forthat any premium that the deal earned for him over his costs of production
was simply the result of different perceptions of the situation by the two parties. If, excluding the possibility of a deal, the opponent's next best, or only,
alternative given ADMIT is DO NOTHING, then the declarant will be produced
only if the parties make a deal. In those circumstances, they will make a deal
only if they perceive the situation in contradictory ways: First, the opponent
must perceive that LT would be sufficiently more favorable to his litigation position than H to warrant the payment; second, the proponent must perceive
either that LT is better than H for his litigation position, or that if it is worse
the sacrifice is small enough to be worthwhile in light of the premium (i.e., the
payment less his costs of producing the declarant). In this situation, the proponent arguably ought to be allowed to keep the benefit of his bargain; if, in fact,
LT is far worse for him than H, he will pay the consequences of misperception.
If, on the other hand, the opponent's next best alternative was PRODUCE,
then the declarant will be produced whether or not the parties make a deal. If
they do make a deal, the proponent gives up nothing, and simply makes a
profit by selling witness-production services more cheaply than the opponent
could himself produce the declarant. The deal might be mutually advantageous, given that the burden of producing the declarant has been imposed on
the opponent. Fairness and efficiency, however, weigh in favor only of imposing the actual burden on the opponent-not the burden plus a premium.
73. See Friedman, supra note 9, at 904-16.
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mer employee of Propco, is an example of a case in which a
rather simple SPLIT BURDEN solution seems available. The
court should impose on Propco the burden of identifying the
declarant and of locating her to the extent of determining her
address as of the time she left Propco; the remainder of the
burden should be imposed on Oppco. In other words, if Propco
declines to provide Oppco with the declarant's name and last
known address, the court excludes the hearsay. If Propco does
provide the information to Oppco, the court admits the hearsay
unless Oppco finishes the job of producing the declarant.
In Hypothetical 10, involving a statement by an acquaintance of Paul's whom Otto could not feasibly locate, a simple
solution also appears available. The court probably should impose on Paul the burden of locating Dorothy, and on Otto the
remaining aspects of the burden of producing her. If Paul does
not provide Otto with Dorothy's current address, the court
should exclude the hearsay. If he does, the court should admit
the hearsay unless Otto produces Dorothy.
Note that in each of these cases, the suggested solution is to
impose on the proponent only those aspects of the burden as to
which it has a substantial advantage over the opponent. In Hypothetical 9, Propco can far more easily determine the declarant's identity and her past address. Given that information,
Oppco appears to be in as good a position as Propco to produce
the declarant. In Hypothetical 10, on the other hand, given that
Paul and Dorothy have mutual friends, it is presumably much
easier for him than for Otto to track her down.
In Hypotheticals 9 and 10, the proponent has an advantage
in information. Sometimes the proponent might have another
type of advantage that would warrant dividing the physical burden. Thus, in Hypothetical 11, Paul has an advantage in that he
could persuade his sister Denise to testify, but Otto could not.
The court might impose on Paul the burden of persuading Denise to testify, and on Otto the remaining aspects of the burden
of producing her as a witness. For example, the court might
rule that it will admit the hearsay unless Otto commits himself
to arranging, and paying, for Denise's transportation, assuming
she is willing to appear. Thus, Otto would have to decide
whether or not it was worthwhile to go to the trouble and expense of ensuring her appearance, assuming her willingness to
appear. If Otto decides in the affirmative, then Paul must decide whether or not to persuade Denise to appear. If he de-
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clines to persuade her, the hearsay would be excluded. 74
Hypothetical 12, involving a statement by a person who
could claim a Fifth Amendment privilege, presents another situation in which only the proponent, here a criminal prosecutor,
could induce the declarant to testify. The prosecutor could accomplish this most simply by granting her use immunity, assuming the law of the jurisdiction will allow it. But the
hearsay is more probative than prejudicial. The court therefore
might impose on the prosecution the burden of nullifying the
Fifth Amendment problem and on the opponent, Acker, the remaining aspects of the burden of producing the declarant, Diana. This might be done in various ways. For example, the
court might rule that it will exclude the hearsay unless the
prosecution commits to granting Diana use immunity (or otherwise removing the Fifth Amendment problem, as by a plea bargain) if she is brought to court; if the prosecution does make
that commitment, the hearsay would be admitted unless Acker
produces Diana in court.
Figure 4 represents in general terms the type of ruling discussed above, which I call SPLIT BURDEN (PROPONENT
FIRST). As this diagram indicates, the declarant testifies live if
and only if each party performs its designated part of the burden, indicated by PART-PRODUCE, and bears the attendant
costs (indicated by the subscripts p' and o', read, respectively
"p-prime" and "o-prime"). Under this variation of SPLIT BURDEN, the proponent is required to commit first as to whether it
will perform its designated share of the burden; if it chooses DO
NOTHING, the hearsay is excluded, without the opponent having to make any commitment. Other variations of SPLIT BURDEN are possible. Figure 5, for example, which in a sense is a
mirror image of Figure 4, represents SPLIT BURDEN (OPPONENT FIRST). Under this version, the opponent is required to
commit first, and if it chooses DO NOTHING, the hearsay is admitted without the proponent having to commit. 75 Which vari-

ation of SPLIT BURDEN is preferable depends on an assessment
74.

There is actually a variety of ways in which the court right achieve

the same division of the burden. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
75. Note that both Figures 4 and 5 indicate costs of zero if the first party
chooses PART-PRODUCE but the second chooses DO NOTHING. These diagrams are drawn on the assumption that, though the first party must commit
before the second party, the first party does not actually have to perform its
share of the burden until after the second party commits. Thus, if the second
part chooses DO NOTHING, there is no cost. See infra note 76.
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of the precise circumstances of the case.76
Whichever variation of SPLIT BURDEN the court selects, by
76. Consider Hypothetical 12 again. In this case, either party could be
called on to perform its portion of the burden (or suffer an adverse evidentiary
result), before the other is called on to perform his share of the burden. That
is, the prosecutor could be called on to grant use immunity to the declarant
either before or after the accused brings her to court. Most often, though,
where there is no doubt that if the declarant were in court she would have to
testify, the respective portions of the burden have to be performed in a natural
chronological order-the declarant must be identified before she can be located and must be located before she can be brought to court.
Whether or not there is flexibility as to the sequence in which the parties
can be called on to perform their portions of the burden, there is flexibility as
to the sequence in which they may be called on to commit as to whether they
will perform. In this hypothetical, for example, it makes no sense for Acker to
produce Diana in court, which might be an expensive process, unless the prosecution has at least committed to nullifying the Fifth Amendment problem.
And it probably makes no sense for the prosecution to go to the trouble of nullifying that problem unless Acker has committed that, if the problem is or will
be removed, he will commit to produce Diana in court. It seems, then, that to
prevent wasted effort, each side should be called on to commit to whether it
will perform its share of the burden before the other side is called on to perform its share.
The question then becomes the sequence in which the parties should be
required to state their commitments. This question is important not only to
save wasted effort but also because it might affect the ultimate evidentiary result. Whichever party is called on to commit second has an advantage: If the
first party does not commit to performing its share of the burden, the second
party gets the evidentiary result it desires, without ever having to commit.
This asymmetry may be eliminated by effectively requiring the parties to commit simultaneously; the court might, for example, ask each party to submit a
written statement of its intent. This type of ruling, which I call SPLIT BURDEN (SIMULTANEOUS MOVES), is discussed in Friedman, supra note 9, at 91215. When the court wants to avoid going through this simultaneous commitment process, the following rule of thumb may be appropriate: If the hearsay
is more probative than prejudicial, require the opponent to commit first (thus
ensuring that if the opponent is unwilling or unable to perform his task the
hearsay will be admitted), unless the task imposed on the proponent is essentially cost-free (in which case the proponent's refusal to perform is probably
highly significant); correspondingly, if the hearsay is more prejudicial than
probative, call on the proponent to commit first, unless the opponent's task is
essentially cost-free. For a fuller discussion of this topic of sequencing, see
Friedman, supm note 9, at 910-15.
In Hypothetical 12, the evidence is assumed to be more probative than
prejudicial. Thus, a decision requiring the prosecution to commit first would
reflect a judgment that eliminating the Fifth Amendment problem would be
essentially cost-free for the prosecution. (This is probably so given that it is
not anticipated that Diana would be prosecuted; on the other hand, granting
her use immunity now might create difficult hindrances in a later prosecution,
because the prosecutor would have to show that he is not relying on the immunized statement. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).). If the
court is in doubt on this score, the safest thing to do might be to require simultaneous commitments.
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Figure 4

dividing the physical burden in cases such as Hypotheticals 9
through 12, the court is able to take advantage of the proponent's superior or exclusive ability to perform part of the set of
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tasks necessary for producing the declarant. At the same time,
because the tasks imposed on the proponent should not cost it
any substantial amount of time or money, the division leaves
virtually the entire financial burden where it belongs, given
that the hearsay is more probative than prejudicial-on the
opponent.
SPLIT BURDEN can have significant problems, however.
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Sometimes it is inefficient for the burden to be broken down.
In Hypothetical 8, for example, in which the proponent but not
the opponent can easily locate a fast-moving declarant, it probably makes little sense to set up a procedure in which the proponent locates her and passes the information on to the opponent
and the opponent then subpoenas her. Sometimes, if in the end
the declarant is not produced, it might be unclear whose fault
caused her absence. The court should be reluctant to have to
adjudicate a squabble over who dropped this relay baton.
Furthermore, the portion of the burden imposed on the
proponent might not be cost-free. Recall that for now we are
assuming that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial.
Thus, for goals of both fairness and efficiency, the court should
impose the cost of producing the declarant on the opponent.
These goals are undercut to the extent that the portion of the
burden imposed on the proponent carries substantial cost, financial or otherwise. For example, if Hypothetical 12 is varied
so that the prosecutor is seriously considering prosecuting Diana, he might have significant reasons not to grant her use
immunity.
Finally, if the court is imposing part of the burden on the
proponent simply because of the proponent's presumed advantage in carrying that portion of the burden, the court should
take great care that the proponent really is able to perform
that portion. In Hypothetical 11, for example, what happens if
in fact Paul is not able to persuade his sister to appear? If he
has tried in good faith, the court might prefer treating the case
as one in which the declarant was simply unavailable, which
would presumably lead to ADMIT. But the court will not wish
77
to engage too often in adjudications of good faith.
c. Separatingthe Physical and FinancialBurdens
In some cases, the courts might sensibly impose the entire
physical burden on the proponent and the entire financial burden on the opponent. Consider the following hypothetical.
Hypothetical 13: A variation on Hypothetical 9. Propco wants to in-

troduce a memo written by an employee not identified on the face of
the memo. The memo is an entry in a computerized record, and
Propco can identify the author of the memo only after a search that
will require a more than trivial amount of staff time and some highpriced computer time. Only Propco employees could conduct the
search, at least without revealing proprietaryinformation. Prpco's
77. This difficulty is discussed at greater length in Friedman, supra note
9, at 914-15.
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sole office is located in Courthouse City, and the memo was written
only one year before the time of the trial. Thus, once the authorof the
memo is identified, either party could presumably produce her as a
witness without difficulty. The court is satisfied that the memo is
more probative than prejudicial

In these circumstances, ADMIT is probably not an appealing
choice for the court; Oppco could not produce the declarant itself, and, given that fact, Propco might be unwilling to agree
with Oppco to produce her.
Nor does it seem wise to adopt a variation of SPLIT BURDEN-for example, by imposing on Propco the burden of identifying and locating the declarant, and on Oppco the remaining
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portions of producing her. Identifying the declarant may be difficult and expensive. Because the hearsay statement appears
more probative than prejudicial, the expense of producing the
declarant should not be incurred unless Oppco is willing to bear
it. Propco should not be the one bearing that expense.
Thus, in this case, the best ruling might be to impose on
Oppco the entire financial burden of producing the declarant
and on Propco the entire physical burden of producing her.
Figure 6 represents this allocation, which may be called OPPONENT'S OPTION, in general terms. (The reverse allocation,
PROPONENT'S OPTION, is not pictured here.) OPPONENT'S
OPTION would most sensibly be implemented in this case as
follows: 78 The hearsay would be admitted unless Oppco de78. In other cases, other sequences might be preferable. See supra note 76
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cided to DEMAND production, committing itself to paying
Propco's costs of producing the declarant. If Oppco did commit
itself to doing that, then the hearsay would be excluded unless
Propco produced her. And if Propco did produce her, Oppco
then would have to pay Propco its costs, a payment indicated by
the notation -$ . The court would determine the amount of
the payment if tle parties were unable to agree.
This OPPONENT'S OPTION ruling assures that the opponent will bear the costs of producing the declarant. At the
same time, the ruling gives the opponent the benefit of the proponent's production advantage-without the necessity of having
to pay a premium for it and without having to negotiate for it.
This does not mean that negotiations have no role under
OPPONENT'S OPTION. Because the opponent has the right to
demand production by the proponent, all that must be determined is the compensation. And given that the court will set
the compensation absent agreement by the parties, the parties
may be able to negotiate efficiently a reasonable compensation.
Sometimes, though, negotiations will break down, and the
court will have to determine the compensation. It might not be
able to do this accurately. For example, if the court determines
the compensation before the proponent actually produces the
declarant, events might not bear out its prediction. If the court
waits until after the fact to determine the compensation, the
proponent will have no incentive to act efficiently, because he
will in effect be spending his opponent's money. Accordingly,
OPPONENT'S OPTION should not be used indiscriminately.
Courts should use it only when they think that the proponent
make the adminishas a large enough production advantage to
79
trative costs and uncertainties worthwhile.
(discussing the problem of sequencing of commitments); infra notes 82-83 and
accompanying text (discussing a possible requirement that proponent commit
first when motives are suspect). Note that, although the opponent in Hypothetical 13 cannot produce the declarant by itself, Figure 6, being drawn gener-

ally, does indicate this possibility.
79. By now, some readers might recognize a familial resemblance between
the analysis here and that in Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 44. The decision to impose the financial burden on the opponent might be considered an
initial entitlement for the proponent to have the hearsay admitted without his
having to produce the declarant. The entitlement might be protected by a
property rule or by a liability rule.
A property rule would mean that if the opponent wants to remove the entitlement from the proponent, he must enter into a voluntary transaction with
the seller; this is ADMIT, allowing the possibility of a deal after the court issues
its ruling. (I have focused in the text on a deal in which the proponent agrees
to produce the declarant. There could be other deals, however, in which the
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Another reason to avoid indiscriminate use of OPPONENT'S OPTION is that, as with SPLIT BURDEN, if the court is
incorrect in its belief that the proponent can produce the declarant, the ruling may unintentionally amount to an exclusion
of the hearsay. If the opponent realizes that the proponent cannot produce the declarant, he would exercise the option; given
the proponent's failure to produce the declarant, the hearsay
would then be excluded. As with SPLIT BURDEN, the court
might avoid this result by providing that, if the proponent made
a good faith effort to satisfy his part of the burden, he should
not be held accountable for his failure. Most often, though, the
court would prefer not having to resolve this issue.
proponent agrees to do without any evidence from the declarant, or retains the
option to do one or the other. I see no reason why such agreements ought not
ordinarily be honored; in other words, there is no sound reason to adopt an
inalienability rule.)
A liability rule would mean that the opponent might destroy the entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined price for it; this is OPPONENT'S OPTION. Removal of the entitlement would mean that the
proponent must either produce the declarant or do without the benefit of any
evidence from the declarant. Under OPPONENT'S OPTION, the opponent
would actually have to pay the price only if the proponent chose the first alternative. One way to think of this is to say that if the proponent is unwilling
to produce the declarant even though he does not have to pay the expenses of
doing so, he ought to forfeit the initial entitlement. From another perspective,
OPPONENT'S OPTION might be considered an order to the proponent, contingent on the opponent's making the demand, to produce the declarant in return
for compensation, with the sanction for the proponent's failure to comply being the loss of the compensation for removal of the entitlement.
By a similar analysis, EXCLUDE and PROPONENT'S OPTION (imposition
of the financial burden on the proponent and the physical burden on the opponent) might be considered alternative ways of protecting an initial entitlement
allocated to the opponent. Whether the parties should be allowed to agree on
admissibility of hearsay notwithstanding a ruling by the court tentatively excluding it is an interesting question. I believe they ordinarily should. Often, a
similar result is accomplished without even presenting the issue to the court,
by the parties' exercise of mutual restraint in objecting to each other's evidence.
The various forms of SPLIT BURDEN would represent a different, contingent allocation of the initial entitlement. The solution suggested for Hypothetical 9, for example, would represent an initial entitlement for Oppco unless
Propco provided Oppco with the name and last known address of the declarant.
I have not used the terminology of Calabresi and Melamed in the text, in
part because, although of broad applicability, it would probably seem awkward
in the hearsay context. Moreover, there are substantial differences between
the hearsay situation and the type of situation that is at the center of their
concern; a glib attempt to apply their analysis here probably would be counterproductive. But this does not minimize the importance of their analysis in the
conception and preparation of this Article.
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Finally, OPPONENT'S OPTION will not effectively transfer
to the opponent all the costs of producing the declarant, because not all those costs are financial. In Hypothetical 11, for
example, Paul may find it distasteful to ask his sister to interrupt her travels. More significantly, in cases resembling Hypothetical 12, but in which prosecution of the declarant is a
substantial prospect, nullifying the Fifth Amendment problem
in the current case may pose real obstacles to the later prosecution. It probably would not make sense to try to require the accused in the first prosecution, as the price of procuring the
declarant's testimony, to compensate the prosecutor for the impediment to the later case. The court will have to choose between imperfect alternatives.8 0
d. Imposing on the Opponent All of the FinancialBurden
and Partof the Physical Burden
In some instances, it might make sense to combine SPLIT
BURDEN and OPPONENT'S OPTION. That is, a court might impose part of the physical burden on the proponent and the rest
of the physical burden, and the entire financial burden, on the
opponent.
Hypothetical 14: Same facts as Hypothetical 13 (involving a memo
the author of which can be identified only after a substantial inquiry), except that, as in Hypothetical 9, the memo was written five
years ago, and the authorpresumably is no longer with Propco because three years ago Propco closed the office from which the memo
was written.

Here, only Propco can feasibly identify the declarant, and
it, far more efficiently than Oppco, can locate her as of the time
she left its employ. Accordingly, the court should impose the
physical burden of performing those tasks on Propco.
On the other hand, given that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial, the court probably should impose all the
other aspects of the burden of producing the declarant Oppco.
The tasks assigned to Propco are expensive, and Oppco ought to
80. If the court chooses SPLIT BURDEN, imposing on the prosecutor the
burden of nullifying the Fifth Amendment problem, the prosecutor will be put
to a choice of forgoing the evidence or impeding the anticipated prosecution of
the declarant. (Given that the hearsay is more probative than prejudicial, this
ruling is at least preferable to EXCLUDE, which denies the prosecutor this
choice and simply imposes the entire burden on her.) On the other hand, if
the court chooses ADMIT, the hearsay will be admitted, but the accused will
not have an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Which ruling to
choose will depend on which of these problems seems greater in the particular
case.
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bear the cost of performing them, if they are to be performed.
Furthermore, once Propco determines the name and last
known address of the declarant, Oppco is in substantially as
good a position to produce her as is Propco. Thus, Oppco
should bear the cost of producing her and also the risk that she
cannot be produced, which, if the declarant has left Propco,
may be substantial.
This best method of allocating this burden would probably
be as follows: The hearsay is admitted unless Oppco demands
that Propco identify the declarant and determine her address
as of the latest time she was in Propco's employ. If Oppco
makes the demand, and Propco does not comply with it, the
hearsay is excluded. If Propco does comply, then Oppco must
compensate Propco for its effort, and the hearsay is admitted,
at least unless Oppco produces the declarant. If Oppco does
produce her, then Propco must present her testimony or forgo
use of the hearsay.
This approach isolates the tasks as to which the proponent
has a production advantage, and, at the same time, does not impose on the proponent any excess burdens. The proponent
avoids the financial burden of those tasks as well as the risk
that any of the other tasks required to produce the declarant
cannot be performed. This ruling therefore is as close to ADMIT
as possible, while still taking advantage of the proponent's advantages. On the other hand, this approach may entail substantial administrative costs. As with OPPONENT'S OPTION, the
court may have to determine compensation for the proponent's
work. And, as with SPLIT BURDEN, the court will sometimes
have to determine whose failure caused the declarant not to be
produced. And, as with both OPPONENT'S OPTION and SPLIT
BURDEN, the court will sometimes have to ascertain whether
the proponent's failure was in good faith.
e. Excluding the Hearsay
To this point, we have not considered the possibility that,
because of the proponent's advantage in producing the declarant, the court should decide simply to EXCLUDE the hearsay,
notwithstanding the fact that it is more probative than prejudicial. But, as discussed previously, if production would have
been relatively easy for the proponent and relatively difficult
for the opponent, that tends to suggest that the proponent decided to offer the hearsay in the first place because he feared
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that the live testimony would be less advantageous to him.8 1
Thus, the proponent's production advantage may be so great as
to make EXCLUDE a tempting solution. Usually, though, a
more parsimonious remedy would suffice. In some circumstances, the court may still find that ADMIT, accompanied by a
"missing witness" argument by the opponent and a supporting
instruction by the court, is an attractive ruling. Somewhat
stronger medicine would be a ruling of OPPONENT'S OPTION,
guaranteeing the opponent the ability to secure the declarant's
production at the proponent's cost.8 2 The remedy might be
made stronger yet by requiring the proponent to commit before
the opponent. That is, unless the proponent signifies a willingness to present the declarant's testimony, assuming the opponent demands production of the declarant, the hearsay is
excluded. 3 If the proponent does express willingness, the op81. See supra pp. 741-42.
82. An argument against this remedy would be that, assuming the proponent has better access than the opponent to the declarant, the opponent may
have no adequate way of assessing whether the probability that the proponent
has withheld the declarant for manipulative reasons is great enough to make
payment for production of the declarant worthwhile. (Conceivably, the opponent will hesitate to pay for producing the declarant because he assumes that,
as in most cases, if cost and difficulty were not a factor, the proponent would
have preferred live testimony to hearsay, whereas actually the proponent prefers the hearsay to live testimony because of information unknown to the opponent.) A partial response is the sequence of decisions suggested in the text,
in which the court makes the proponent at least signal whether he prefers live
testimony, assuming he has to pay for it, to no evidence at all from the declarant.
Beyond that, manipulation of this sort by the proponent is likely to hurt
the opponent only if the hearsay is significant evidence, and manipulation is
most likely to account for the proponent's decision to offer the hearsay rather
than live testimony when it would be relatively easy for him to produce the
declarant. In these circumstances, the opponent would have strong reason to
suspect the proponent's motives and strong incentive to exercise the option,
demanding production of the declarant. The option approach seems better, at
least as a first resort, than a prophylactic rule excluding the hearsay. The prophylactic rule of exclusion would apply even though the hearsay appears to be
net probative, and even though there is no reason, other than the disparity in
ability to produce the declarant, for doubting the proponent's assertion that
the desire to save costs accounts for his decision to offer the hearsay. The
court might try a more finely-tuned rule, excluding the hearsay only if it has
such great significance that production of the declarant at the proponent's cost
clearly is worthwhile. The opponent, however, is better placed than the court
to make the judgment, and if the hearsay is net probative, the opponent
should bear the cost of production. (Occasionally, though, the proponent's failure to offer the live testimony might appear so suspicious that the failure contributes to making the hearsay appear net prejudicial; see supra pp. 741-42).
83. Thus, this sequence calls the proponent's bluff, at least in part, by
making the proponent choose based on the hypothetical assumption that H is
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ponent then must decide whether to demand production by the
proponent. If he does not, the hearsay is admitted.
EXCLUDE does seem to be an appropriate ruling in those
occasional cases in which the proponent's production advantage
is absolute-that is, when the opponent has no means of producing the declarant but the proponent can do so without cost.
At this limit, though, EXCLUDE merges with OPPONENT'S
OPTION. s 4
Hypothetical 15: Acker, the accused in a felony prosecution, does not
wish to take the stand in his own defense. He does, however, offer
proof of a hearsay statement that he has made. The prosecution
objects.

The prosecution (the opponent here) has no way to force
Acker, the declarant, to testify. Acker, on the other hand, can
easily take the stand in his own defense without any out-ofpocket costs. The court might therefore rule that it will exclude the hearsay unless Acker takes the stand and testifies to
his memory of the underlying event or condition that was the
subject of the statement. If Acker does testify, he must, at least
to some extent, waive his privilege against self-incrimination.
That prospect, however, does not appear especially troubling; it
seems unacceptable to allow the accused to present his version
of events through his hearsay statement and then prevent
cross-examination by retreating behind the privilege.
2. When the Hearsay Is More Prejudicial Than Probative and
the Opponent Possesses a Substantial Production
Advantage
Subsection 1 dealt with the situation in which the balance
of probative value versus prejudicial potential favored admission but the proponent's advantage in some aspect of producing
the declarant favored exclusion. The reverse situation might
also arise: The hearsay may be more prejudicial than probative,
but the opponent might have an advantage in producing the declarant. This situation will not be analyzed at great length
here, because in large part the analysis is a mirror image of
not an available possibility. If the proponent believes that, from his point of
view, LT would be worse than NE, or not sufficiently better to warrant the
costs of production, he will not commit himself to producing the declarant if
the opponent exercises the DEMAND option. Note how this sequence differs
from that suggested in connection with Hypothetical 13.
84. Because the proponent's out-of-pocket costs are zero, the opponent
who prefers that the declarant testify live, rather than that the hearsay be admitted, would have no reason not to exercise the option. The proponent therefore must produce the declarant or forgo use of the hearsay.
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that of the first situation8s As an example, consider the following hypothetical:
Hypothetical 16: Paul wishes to introduce for a hearsay purpose a
statement made by a friend of Otto's in a conversation with Pauland
Otto. Paul, however, does not know the name or identity of the declarant If Paul had known well enough before trial that he would want
to present the statemen4 he could have, by means of eitherinterrogatories or deposition questions, required Otto to provide the name and
address of the friend. But the relevance of the statement became apparent only during trial, as a result of evidence introduced by Otto.
The court regards the hearsay as more prejudicial than probative,
though it would be inclined to admit live evidence by the friend.

It might seem that, given that the hearsay evidence is more
prejudicial than probative, the best result is simply to exclude
the hearsay. But, given that live testimony by the declarant
would be useful evidence and that the declarant cannot be produced without participation by the opponent, simple exclusion,
imposing the full burden on the proponent, may be unwise.
Imposing at least part of the burden on the opponent, by virtue
of a sort of reverse best evidence rule, may induce production
of beneficial evidence. 86 In this case, the best solution may be
to adopt a form of SPLIT BURDEN. Because only Otto can provide the name and address of the declarant, the court ought to
place the burden on him to do that. Because the hearsay is
more prejudicial than probative, however, the court should
place all the remaining aspects of the burden on Paul: If Otto
suitably identifies the declarant, the hearsay is excluded unless
Paul produces her.

D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LATE NOTICE
Section B argued that, under certain assumptions, it is usually appropriate to admit hearsay. Section C examined the im85. In at least one sense, however, the situations may not be symmetrical:
If a criminal prosecutor offers evidence of a hearsay statement made by the
accused, and the court believes that the statement is more prejudicial than
probative, the court probably should not (attempting to reflect the logic of the
solution suggested for Hypothetical 15) admit the hearsay on the ground that
the accused can take the stand if he wishes. Given that the statement is net
prejudicial, it seems that such a ruling would put intolerable pressure on the
accused's right not to testify.
86. The so-called best evidence rule, exemplified by Article X of the Federal Rules of Evidence, excludes certain evidence, although net probative, thus
imposing a burden on the proponent and giving him an incentive to produce
evidence that is more net probative. A reverse best evidence rule threatens to
admit evidence that is net prejudicial, thereby imposing a burden on the opponent and giving him an incentive to play a role in producing evidence that is
net probative.
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pact of relaxing the assumption that the parties were
substantially equally able to produce the declarant. This Section relaxes another of the assumptions, that the proponent has
given sufficient notice of his intention to offer the hearsay.
This is important because proponents sometimes give extremely late notice. Indeed, under current practice, often the
first notice the proponent gives of his intention to introduce the
hearsay is his attempt to do so. 8 7 In some cases, the lateness of
notice means that the ability of the opponent, or of both parties, to produce the declarant is prejudiced, and this may alter
the optimal hearsay ruling.
Most of the discussion below assumes that, if notice had
been adequate, the court would have chosen ADMIT. At the
end, I will add a few comments on the consequences of late notice when another ruling would be optimal given adequate
notice.
Lateness of notice will not always have much significance.
For late notice to prejudice the opponent in producing the declarant, it must be true both that producing her would have
been relatively easy given fuller notice, and that producing her
is relatively difficult given the later notice. Thus, if the declarant died before the litigation began, lateness of notice would
not be prejudicial because, even given early notice, the opponent could not have produced the declarant. And at least ordinarily, the lateness of the notice in such a case should not alter
the court's determination on the hearsay motion. At the other
extreme, if the declarant is easily and instantly available even
during trial, the lateness of notice should have little bearing on
the hearsay issue.8 8
Now suppose, however, that it appears that late notice may
have prejudiced the opponent's ability to produce the declarant.
It could be, for example, that it takes a significant amount of
time to identify and locate the declarant and to bring her to
court. Or perhaps at an earlier stage the declarant was readily
available, but in the interim she has died, disappeared, or traveled a substantial distance further away from the courthouse.
If the declarant can still be produced at trial, but not in
time for presentation of her testimony during the proponent's
case, usually the solution would be reasonably simple.
87. Thus, the sardonic trial lawyer's observation that the chief exception
to the hearsay rule is the quick answer.
88. This is true at least if the court would not, given similarly late notice,
bar the proponent from calling the declarant to testify live.
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Hypothetical 17: Without giving priornotice, Propco, on the last afternoon of presenting its case-in-chief,offers the hearsay statement of
Dora Declarant ff Propco had given fuller notice, the court would
have ruled ADMIT, because it regards the statement as more probative
than prejudiciaL It is concerned, however, that Oppco might not be
able to produce Dora immediately, because she recently left on a short
trip out of town. Oppco could however, produce Dora before all the
evidence is in, which is not expected to occurfor three more days.

In a case like this, the court might rule that, as under the
usual ADMIT procedure-modified as suggested in Part III-it
will admit the hearsay declaration unless Oppco timely produces Dora, in which case Propco will present Dora's live testimony (perhaps supplemented by the prior statement) or forgo
use of the hearsay. If the notice had been sufficient, the court
might have provided that production of Dora would be timely
only if it allowed Propco to present her testimony in the sequence preferred by it as part of its case-in-chief. Because of
the late notice, however, Oppco should not be required to produce the declarant during Propco's case-in-chief. Instead, the
court might give Oppco until the end of Propco's rebuttal to
produce her. If it does not produce her then, the hearsay will
be admitted. If it does produce her by then, Propco will have to
present her live testimony or forgo the hearsay. Presentation
of the hearsay or of Dora's live testimony on rebuttal may not
be the most effective order of evidence for Propco. It is reasonable, though, for Propco to absorb that loss so that Oppco will
be able to examine the declarant on cross, rather than having
to make the declarant its own witness. Unless Propco has a
good excuse for the late notice (and arguably even then), it is
also reasonable for Propco to absorb any incremental financial
costs of the late notice.
The more difficult cases occur when, because of the late
notice, the opponent is seriously prejudiced in, or altogether
precluded from, producing the declarant at any time during the
trial, even if the court extends the trial for a reasonable period.
Assume first that the proponent has a good excuse for not giving earlier notice. I will not attempt here to define what constitutes a satisfactory excuse, but will only offer a few examples
of what might be one. In some circumstances, through no lack
of prior diligence, the proponent may learn of the hearsay only
at a late date. Sometimes, surprising developments during
trial-perhaps testimony elicited by the opponent in examining
another witness-might lead the proponent to conclude that he
needs to prove a proposition that he previously did not think he
would have to prove. In some cases, the proponent may expect

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:723

to produce the declarant as a witness, but the declarant,
through no fault of the proponent, becomes unavailable before
testifying.
Hypothetical 18: Without giving prior notice, Paul offers at trial a
hearsay statement by Delores Declarant Paul explains to the satisfaction of the court that the statement became material only the previous
day, as the result of evidence introduced by Otto. Delores left the state
on vacation last week, cannotbe subpoenaed,and may not be back until well after the trial ends. If Paul had given fuller notice, the court
would have admitted the statemen which it regards as more probative than prejudicial.

Given that the proponent has a good excuse, the court
should not necessarily accord the lateness of the notice in itself
any significance. Of course, the ability of the respective parties
to produce the declarant is, as always, an important consideration. But the fact that either party or both may have been able
to produce the declarant if the proponent had known earlier
that there was a potential hearsay dispute probably is inmaterial. Thus, if neither party is able to produce the declarant, the
court probably ought to treat the case just as it would if she
were dead, or, for some other reason, the parties would both be
unable to produce her even given ample notice. The court
probably should not alter the decision to ADMIT, which by hypothesis it would have made given ample notice.
Hypothetical 19: Same basicfacts as Hypothetical 18, but also these in
addition " Delores is Paul's sister,and he could presumably persuade
her to return to testify if it was importantfor him.

In this case, the proponent has a production advantage over
the opponent. Thus, the best solution may be to adopt a ruling
like OPPONENT'S OPTION. Under such a ruling, the opponent
can, if he is willing to pay the cost, demand production by the
proponent and thereby ensure, notwithstanding the lateness of
notice, that either the declarant will testify or the hearsay will
not be admitted. Arguably, if the opponent does demand production, the proponent should be required to absorb any incremental costs caused by the lateness of notice. Given the
assumption that the proponent had a good excuse for the delay,
however, it is probably best not to try such fine-tuning.
Now assume that the proponent does not have a good excuse for the failure to give earlier notice. At least ideally, the
opponent should not be prejudiced by the proponent's delay;
the proponent should absorb any loss. Thus, it might be tempting to conclude that the court should exclude the hearsay in
this circumstance, because the proponent's unexcused delay has
made production of the declarant by the opponent more diffi-
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cult or impossible. The opponent will likely counter that, if the
hearsay issue had been joined earlier and resolved against him,
he surely would have produced the declarant, but now he is unable to, at least without incurring substantially increased
expense.
Such assertions should be taken with a grain of salt. Often
the opponent does not produce the declarant in response to a
ruling admitting hearsay, even when he is perfectly able to do
so. There is no reason to give the opponent a windfall by accepting as certain his retrospective representations that he
would have produced the declarant if he had earlier notice.
There is no reason to exclude the hearsay, simply because the
proponent's delay in giving notice prejudiced the opponent's
ability to produce the declarant, if the delay caused no genuine
prejudice because the opponent would not have produced the
declarant even given ample notice.
If the court is confident on this score, therefore, the lateness of the notice probably should not dissuade it from admitting the hearsay. Determining what the opponent would have
done, given ample notice, does, of course, involve retrospective
second-guessing. The court should ask the opponent to show
not only that production is difficult or impossible now, and also
that it would have been easy if the proponent had given enough
notice. The court should also ask the opponent to show that he
would have had strong enough reason to produce the declarant-for example, enough hope that cross-examination would
be productive. In some cases, the court can make a reasonably
confident determination of what the opponent would have
89
done.
Sometimes, though, the court will be unable to conclude
with sufficient confidence that the opponent would not have
produced the declarant if notice had been sufficient. Even
then, the court should hesitate before simply excluding the
hearsay. Some form of burden splitting frequently offers a better alternative, though in the end it may result in exclusion of
the hearsay. The basic principles behind such a ruling would
be as follows: The opponent ought to bear the financial burden,
to the extent that he would have had to do so if the proponent
had given ample notice; the proponent ought to bear any incre89. Recall that it is sometimes difficult for the court to predict whether
the opponent will find production of the declarant sufficiently important to
warrant the costs. See supra pp. 748-50. It seems possible that ordinarily the
assessment would be no easier to make retrospectively.
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mental financial burden caused by the lateness of notice; and
because the proponent's delay in giving notice has prejudiced
the opponent's ability to produce the declarant, the proponent
ought to bear the physical burden of producing her, at least the
incremental burden caused by the delay and at least to the extent the opponent is not able to produce her much more
efficiently.
Hypothetical 20: Without giving prior notice, and without suffwient
excuse for not giving notice, Propco offers, during its case-in-chief,
the hearsay statement of Dolly Declarant an employee of Oppco.
Dolly lives in distant Remoteville, and special arrangementswould
have to be made to bring her to Courthouse City before the close of testimony. Arranging a deposition-whichin any event would not be as
satisfactory as live testimony-in Remoteville at this point would not
be feasible. The court is persuaded that the statement is more probative than prejudicial,and therefore would have admitted it if Propco
had given adequate notice. The court also believes, however, that
given adequate notice, Oppco might have produced Dolly.

The following fictitious transcript presents a scenario of
how this issue might be resolved:
THE COURT: I don't want Oppco prejudiced at all by Propco's delay.
So this is how I'll rule.
I'm going to admit the hearsay now, Ms. Oppenheimer (Oppco's
counsel), unless you tell me that you're willing to pay an amount
equal to the commercial airfare toward the cost of bringing in the declarant. You would have had to pay that even if you had plenty of
notice, assuming you really would have brought her in. Do you want
to do that?
MS. OPPENHEIMER: Yes, we do, Your Honor. We really don't want
to let her hearsay statement come in without a chance to cross-examine her, because we think her testimony will be a lot clearer than
the statement.
THE COURT: Maybe so. I'm doubtful, but that's your choice. Given
that, Ms. Pratt [Propco's counsel], now the choice is yours. You can
forget about the evidence, or you can try to bring the declarant here.
MS. PRATT: Well, Your Honor, we really need her statement or her
testimony. I think we can get her here tomorrow on the company
plane.
I've got one problem, though. Given that Dolly is an employee of
the defendant, I'm not sure that she'll come in at our behest, and I'm
not even sure I can ethically speak with her to make arrangements.
And a subpoena won't run that far. Therefore, will you ask Ms. Oppenheimer to tell Dolly to cooperate with us?
THE COURT: That sounds reasonable enough, Ms. Oppenheimer. It
doesn't strike me that you're prejudiced by having to do that. Any
objection?
MS. OPPENHEIMER: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: OK, so ordered. I'll assume there won't be any trouble
with that. Now, Ms. Pratt, understand that this case should be ready
for summations by tomorrow afternoon, and I'm not going to keep the
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jury another day just waiting for Dolly. So if you don't get her here
by then, you're out of luck If you get her here before all the other
evidence is in, I'll let you put her on during your rebuttal, and then
you can send Ms. Oppenheimer a bill for the commercial airfare. I assume you'll be grown-ups, and I won't have to arbitrate what fare Ms.
Oppenheimer would have had to pay if you had given adequate notice.
And by the way, counselor, you could have saved yourself a lot of
gasoline and a lot of mileage on the company plane if you had given a
few days' more notice.
MS. PRATT: Understood, Your Honor.

Note that if the declarant has become absolutely unavailable, or for some other reason the opponent is confident that the
proponent would be unable or unwilling to pay the extra costs
of production, a procedure like this would amount to exclusion
of the hearsay: Knowing that the declarant could not be produced, the opponent would have no disincentive to express willingness to pay what it would have cost to produce her if notice
had been ample, and this costless bravado would result in excluding the hearsay. This may give the opponent a windfall, for
he may not have been prepared to produce the declarant if notice had been ample and the court ruled in favor of admitting
the hearsay.
Such a windfall would only arise, however, in a limited
conjunction of circumstances. It must be that the proponent
gave unexcused late notice; the court cannot say with sufficient
confidence that the opponent would have been either unwilling
or unable to produce the declarant if notice had been ample; in
fact, the opponent would not have produced the declarant if notice had been ample; and the opponent has confidence that the
declarant cannot feasibly be produced.
In all other circumstances, this procedure would-assuming that the court could administer it reasonably smoothly and
accurately-avoid giving a windfall to the opponent, but without prejudicing him on account of the proponent's delay in giving notice. The administrative costs cannot be ignored;
determinations of actual costs of production, hypothetical costs
assuming timely notice, and good faith can be very tricky. The
benefits of the procedure are substantial, however, and so
often, probably most often, it will be worth the costs to adopt
this procedure rather than simply exclude the evidence because
of lateness of notice.
So far, this discussion has assumed that the court's optimal
ruling, if notice had been adequate, would have been ADMIT.
The essence of the analysis is that, in some circumstances, the
delay in notice should cause the court to impose the physical
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burden of production, and any incremental costs, on the proponent.90 The same approach might be applied if the optimal ruling, given adequate notice, would have been something other
than ADMIT. For example, suppose that ruling would have

been OPPONENT'S OPTION, meaning that the court would impose the physical burden of production on the proponent anyway. Given delayed notice, the court probably should make the
same ruling, except that the proponent should also be responsible for any incremental costs caused by the delay. And if the
best ruling given adequate notice would have been EXCLUDE,
the proponent's delay in giving notice can only fortify the support for that ruling.
From this analysis, it should be apparent that the court has
a better chance of reaching optimal results at low administrative cost if the proponent gives ample notice of his intention to
offer a hearsay statement. If the court imposes on the proponent the risks and losses caused by his unexcused delay, that
probably creates enough incentive for the proponent to give
sufficient notice. Such an approach avoids overly penalizing the
proponent. Trials are often complex and prepared under great
time pressure. A flat requirement that the parties identify and
give advance notice of all the individual hearsay statements
that they intend to produce would entail administrative costs
and probably put excessive demands on the organizational abilities and foresight of most lawyers. Also, failure to give notice
would create a ground of objection in many cases where otherwise a successful objection would be unlikely.
Courts might, however, reasonably create some extra inducement to parties to give early notice. Many courts require
parties in advance of trial to provide lists of witnesses that they
intend to call.9 1 It may be appropriate to advise them at the
90. The same principles, in reverse, might apply when the proponent has
given advance notice but the opponent has been dilatory in objecting to the evidence. That is, if, given a timely objection, the court would have put the burden of producing the declarant on the proponent, the delay of the objection
might induce the court to shift the physical burden and the incremental financial burden to the opponent.
91. Under proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A), each
party would have to provide every other party, shortly after the commencement of the action, with "the name and, if known, the address and telephone
number of each individual likely to have information that bears significantly
on any claim or defense." See 112 S. Ct. at cxxvi-cxxvii. Under proposed Rule
26(a)(3), each party must, at least thirty days before trial unless otherwise directed, provide the other parties with the names of each witness "whom the
party expects to present and those whom the party may call if the need
arises," the names of witnesses whose testimony the party expects to present
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same time to identify all the hearsay statements that they expect to offer. That is, the court may prescribe a time and
method for the parties to give pretrial notice of intent to offer
hearsay (without prejudice to earlier notice where the proponent thinks that might be helpful). Failure to list a given statement would not necessarily preclude admission of the
statement at trial. The judge might make it clear, however,
that if a statement were not listed, she would be reluctant to
conclude that the proponent had a sufficient excuse for giving
late notice. The proponent therefore would likely suffer adverse consequences, at least in allocation of the burden of producing the declarant, and perhaps in the ultimate evidentiary
result as well.92
by deposition, and an identification of each exhibit that the party anticipates
offering. I&i at cxxix.
92. Note that, unlike other arguments sometimes made for notice of intent to offer hearsay, e.g., Park, supra note 28, at 119; Weinstein, supra note 5,
at 340-41, the argument offered here is not based to a substantial degree on the
desirability of preventing surprise; rather, it is based on the desirability of facilitating the opponent's effort to produce the declarant, if he should decide to
do so. It is not usually a reason for excluding testimony of a witness that the
opponent is surprised by the testimony; nor should it be, particularly when liberal discovery gives the opponent satisfactory means of minimizing the chance
that he will be surprised by hearing testimony for the first time at trial. Opponents probably are no more likely, or perhaps even less likely, to be surprised
by hearsay than by other forms of the witness's testimony; sometimes, in fact,
the opponent might have been present when the hearsay declaration was
made.
Furthermore, when the opponent is surprised, the prejudice is usually no
greater with respect to hearsay than with respect to other testimony--except
to the extent that the surprise hinders the opponent from producing the declarant. An opponent's cross-examination of a witness who testifies to the underlying events is likely to be impaired substantially if the opponent is
surprised by the testimony, and later efforts might be transparent attempts to
repair the damage. When the witness's testimony is of a hearsay statement,
the opponent may face the same difficulty, to the extent he wishes to challenge the credibility of the witness on the stand. To the extent the opponent
wishes to challenge the statement allegedly made by the declarant, though,
there is a limited amount that the opponent can do with the witness on the
stand, no matter how much advance notice he has; the challenge to the declarant's credibility must come later, so that even if the opponent is surprised, he
has some time to put his response together without it being manifestly a reaction to surprising evidence. In order for surprise to prejudice the opponent
significantly in challenging the declarant, there would have to be some effective response, perhaps a demonstration of some non-obvious bias on the part of
the declarant, that the opponent would have been able to mount had he been
given fuller notice, but is unable to mount before the end of the trial given the
short notice. I do not believe this problem arises often (though, of course, it is
impossible to be sure). It is probably better for the court to respond individu-
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CONCLUSION

I will offer a summary of sorts by pointing to several respects in which the approach suggested here differs from--and,
I believe, is superior to--current hearsay doctrine.
(1) Under the received wisdom guiding current doctrine,
the key considerations in determining whether to admit hearsay are circumstantial probability of trustworthiness and the
necessity for the evidence. 93 These standards do not work.
Trustworthiness cannot be a good guide, because even the
model evidence, in-court testimony subject to cross-examination, need not be at all trustworthy. Although sometimes one
party will not present evidence at all, the classic trial is all
about the presentation of conflicting evidence. Logically, some
of that evidence must not be trustworthy.
The better question, as suggested in this Article, is whether
the fact that the evidence is hearsay, and so is subject to possible jury overvaluation, makes it more prejudicial than probative-that is, a net hindrance to the truth-determining process.
Assessing trustworthiness is, at best, a very rough proxy for assessing the danger of jury overvaluation. If the judge deems
the evidence trustworthy, she may be confident that whatever
probative value the jury assigns it will not be substantially excessive. Thus, trustworthiness does state a sufficient condition
for satisfying the probative-versus-prejudicial balance. But
trustworthiness is not a necessary condition for satisfying that
balance. Suppose an item of evidence is highly probative, in
that it alters the probability of a material proposition, and not
particularly prejudicial, because the jury is able to assess it reasonably well. Nevertheless this evidence is not necessarily
trustworthy, because even given the evidence, the material
proposition may be subject to reasonable dispute. Determining
the disputed factual issues of the case is the jury's job. The
court should not, in effect, require that, before allowing the
jury to hear evidence, the court itself must be persuaded of the
truth of the proposition the evidence is offered to prove. If the
jury has some ability to recognize hearsay dangers, and to discount the statement accordingly, the statement is probably
more probative than prejudicial, even if the judge does not have
complete confidence in the statement's accuracy.
ally to cases where this danger appears to be significant than to create a broad
and rigid notice requirement.
93. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1420-

1423 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
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As to necessity, if in fact the evidence is more probative
than prejudicial, that is sufficient demonstration that the evidence is necessary: If the case is in dispute, there is a need for
any evidence that will advance the truth-determining process.
The more appropriate question is whether a better grade of evidence, live testimony, would be sufficiently more valuable to
warrant its production, assuming production is feasible. The
analysis presented here suggests that generally the court
should not attempt to answer that question directly. Rather,
the court should allocate the burden of producing the declarant
in a way best suited to lead to a fair and efficient result, taking
into account the impact of the hearsay on the truth-determining process and the respective abilities of the parties to produce
the declarant.
(2) Under current doctrine, hearsay is presumptively excluded, and admitted only if it is deemed to fit one of a long list
of exceptions. I believe that under the approach presented
here, the presumption would be reversed because most often
the fact that a statement is hearsay does not mean that it has
more prejudicial potential than probative value. As with other
types of evidence having significant probative value, the opponent has the burden of showing why it should be excluded.
Also, as with other evidence, the opponent ordinarily is left
with the burden of presenting evidence that he thinks might
rebut the evidence offered by the proponent. This makes admission of the hearsay-as well as a responsive decision by the
opponent to secure the production of declarant-far more
likely.
(3) Under current doctrine, if the opponent of hearsay produces the declarant, he must examine her under unfavorable
circumstances. The approach suggested here would eliminate
that disadvantage. And this often makes it far more palatable
to impose on the opponent the burden of producing the
declarant.
(4) With some important exceptions, current doctrine pays
little attention to the ability of the opponent to produce the declarant.94 Indeed, current doctrine pays only limited attention
94. One exception is the doctrine exempting party admissions from the
hearsay ban. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). The doctrine is often, though not always
accurately, defended on the basis that the party to whom the statement is attributable, directly or vicariously, and against whom the statement is offered,
can put the maker on the stand. Also, the residual exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), provide that the proponent cannot invoke them unless he gives advance notice, including the name
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even to the ability of the proponent to produce the declarant.
Notwithstanding the supposed significance of the necessity for
the evidence, availability is a factor only with respect to a few
of the hearsay exceptions. When current doctrine does make
the availability of the declarant a significant factor, availability
is generally treated as a binary factor-the declarant is either
available or unavailable. The approach presented here makes
the ability of each of the parties to produce the declarant a potentially significant factor in determining the court's precise
ruling. And it recognizes that, except in the case of death and
some other extreme cases, availability is a matter of degree-of
how much money and effort it would take to produce the
declarant.
(5) Current doctrine has nothing resembling the procedures proposed here in which the burden of producing the declarant is split between the parties. These burden-splitting
procedures make it possible, for example, for the court to take
advantage of the proponent's superior ability to perform part of
the set of tasks necessary to produce the declarant and yet to
impose on the opponent remaining aspects of the burden.
Thus, only rarely is the best solution a ruling simply excluding
the hearsay and thereby imposing on the proponent the entire
burden, both physical and financial.
(6) Under current doctrine, a statement otherwise characterized as hearsay is, with exceptions, no less hearsay because
the declarant is on the witness stand. Under the approach suggested here, the rule concerning prior statements by a witness
is a preferential one: Ordinarily, the witness should first testify
from current memory, and then, if the proponent still wants to
introduce the hearsay statement, the court should assess
whether the statement has sufficient incremental probative
value to warrant admission.
(7) For the most part, current doctrine does not make
prior notice of intention to offer hearsay significant. 95 The approach presented here recognizes that optimal decisions are
more likely if the proponent gives ample notice, and holds him
and address of the declarant. This requirement, which some courts have declined to follow, see Park, supra note 28, at 101 n.206, apparently was meant to
facilitate the opponent's attempt to produce the declarant.
95. As mentioned above, on the face of the residual exceptions, Rules
803(24) and 804(b)(5), prior notice appears to be essential for application of the
exceptions, but these rules have not always been applied strictly. See supra
note 94.
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accountable for his failure to do so. It does not, however, create
a flat rule requiring prior notice.
(8) Current doctrine relies heavily on a categorical approach, making most decisions dependent on whether or not
the given hearsay statement fits within one of the many enumerated exemptions from the rule against hearsay. This often
requires a good deal of "book learning" for a judge to make the
decision prescribed by the doctrine. Not surprisingly, judges,
like students, often find hearsay doctrine baffling. No matter
how predictable hearsay law may be in theory, judicial error
therefore makes it less so in practice. The approach suggested
here, by contrast, focuses on the practical considerations surrounding the particular statement at issue-its probative value
and prejudicial impact, and the difficulties that the parties
would have in producing the declarant. Courts considering
these factors would not always come to the same results, of
course. But their rulings would be reasonably predictable, and
usually sensible, because their attention would be focused on
the questions that they should ask in ruling on a hearsay
objection.
The court might ask both the proponent and opponent several questions: What probative value do you believe the hearsay has, and what do you believe is its prejudicial potential?9
Is there any task necessary to producing the declarant that
your adversary could perform but that you could not, or that he
could perform substantially more efficiently than you could? If
so, how great is the disparity?
If the proponent is late in giving notice of his intention to
introduce the hearsay, the court might also ask both parties:
Could you produce the declarant? If not, why not? If so, how
quickly? Of the proponent, the court might also ask: Why did
you not give notice earlier? And of the opponent, the court
96. Subsidiary questions that the court might ask in attempting to assess
the probative-prejudicial balance include the following:
Of the proponent: Are there particular circumstances assisting the jury in
evaluating the reliability of the hearsay statement even in the absence of the
declarant? Can you represent that you have no reason to believe that, if the
declarant were to testify live, she would depart materially from the hearsay
statement? Is there any affirmative reason to believe that, if she were to testify, she would adhere to the hearsay statement?
Of the opponent: Are there particular circumstances suggesting that the
jury will not discount the hearsay sufficiently to take into account the absence
of the declarant? Do you have any affirmative reason to believe that if the declarant were to testify live she would depart in a material way from her hearsay statement?
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might ask: Is there any reason to believe you would have had
an easier time producing the declarant if you had been given
earlier notice? If so, how expensive do you think it would have
been to produce the declarant then, and how would you expect
live testimony by the declarant to be more favorable to your
case than admission of the hearsay?
If the analysis presented in this Article is correct, but the
court does not base its rulings on the answers to questions such
as these, one might wonder how close to the mark those rulings
can be. If the court asks such questions, a sound course of decision usually will become apparent; if not, it may be because it
would be reasonable either to admit the evidence or select some
form of burden-splitting. Rather seldom would the best choice
be simply to exclude the evidence.
One side benefit to the court of the approach presented
here may be that opponents would be less likely to make hearsay objections if the court's likely response would be something
like the following:
OK, counselor, I'll call your bluff. If it's so important to you to be
able to examine the declarant, why don't you bring her in? I'm sure
that if you do, your adversary will be delighted to present her live testimony, and then you'll have a chance to cross-examine.

